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ENVISIONING ENFORCEMENT OF FREEDOM OF
ASSOCIATION STANDARDS IN CORPORATE
CODES: A JOURNEY FOR SINBAD OR SISYPHUS?
James J. Brudneyt
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the 1970's, multinational corporations (MNCs) in large numbers
have adopted codes of conduct declaring their commitment to workers'
rights.' Pressure from unions and human rights groups helped to generate
this development among MNCs, and almost all current codes promote
corporate respect for the rights to freedom of association (FOA) and
collective bargaining.2  At the same time, the codes do not require
adherence to specific labor regulations or standards in a global setting, and
the MNC record on voluntary compliance has been discouraging. That
record has been especially disappointing in labor-intensive industries like
apparel, shoes, and toys, where a global supply chain of contractors
effectively controls labor conditions. 3  The persistent gap between
aspiration and achievement regarding corporate codes has led to
disagreement over their meaning and value.
Business supporters view codes of conduct as enhancing corporate
reputations with diverse audiences. A publicly announced pledge to
promote decent working conditions can help in recruiting and retaining
certain types of employees, in attracting consumers or investors who prefer
to engage with a socially responsible company, and in mollifying regulators
who must allocate their limited resources among delinquent actors.4 More
t Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. I am grateful to Cindy Estlund, Jennifer
Gordon, Sean Griffith, Paul Rose, and Richard Squire for valuable comments on an earlier draft, to
Karin Johnsrud, Melanie Luthern, Patrick Noonan, and Anthony Piccirillo for excellent research
assistance, and to Debra Rivera for able secretarial support.
1. See generally Jill Esbenshade, Monitoring Sweatshops: WORKERS, CONSUMERS, AND THE
GLOBAL APPAREL INDUSTRY (2004); Rhys Jenkins, The Political Economy of Codes of Conduct, in
Corporate Responsibility And Labour Rights: Codes Of Conduct in the Global Economy 13-22 (Rhys
Jenkins et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND LABOUR RIGHTS].
2. See infra Part II.A.
3. See generally CYNTHIA ESTLUND, REGOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: FROM SELF-REGULATION
To Co-REGULATION 97-98 (2010) and sources cited therein.
4. See generally Robert H. Montgomery & Gregory F. Maggio, Fostering Labor Rights in
Developing Countries: An Investors'Approach to Managing Labor Issues, 87 J. BUS. ETHICS 199, 200
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skeptical observers from the labor, human rights, and academic
communities regard corporate codes as largely ineffective. In practical
terms, the codes are not enforced rigorously from within, they are not
adequately monitored for performance by an independent body, and they do
not include sanctions for noncompliance.' As such, they have been
criticized as windowdressing or worse.
Given the self-regulatory nature of corporate codes, it is hardly
surprising that they lack effective outside monitors or remedial
consequences. Yet, the absence of an enforcement structure is troubling
when considering the codes' possible underlying purposes. If a corporate
code is meant to attract and retain customers and investors by promoting
humane working conditions, or to guide and constrain supervisors in their
personnel practices, one might argue that some form of enforcement is
appropriate to effectuate the company's actual intent. If, on the other hand,
a code is meant to pacify, deceive, or exploit unsophisticated consumers,
investors, or employees, one might contend that some form of enforcement
is needed to prevent what is tantamount to a fraud.
Put somewhat differently, MNCs hope to be judged on the basis of the
internal systems they have established. They believe that codes and
accompanying monitoring practices will generate economically profitable
good will and also give rise to a legal safe harbor.6  In light of these
ambitious corporate assumptions, it is worth asking whether the application
of codes should be subject to outside challenge, and potential improvement,
on behalf of putative beneficiaries.7
This Article examines the possibilities for enforcing corporate codes
against the MNCs that draft and promulgate them. Part II provides an
overview of the FOA provisions that appear in codes on corporate websites.
A review of more than twenty-five corporate codes indicates divergent
approaches regarding inter alia how much depth and force the FOA
commitment contains; whether the same FOA commitment applies to a
(2008); Lutz Preuss, Ethical Sourcing Codes of Large UK-Based Corporations: Prevalence, Content,
Limitations, 88 J. BUS. ETHICS 735, 735 (2009); Business for Social Responsibility, "Codes of
Conduct," BSR Business Brief (October 2003), in JAMES ATLESON ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LABOR
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON WORKERS' RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 486-88 (2008).
5. See generally ESBENSHADE, supra note 1, at 60-118, 145-64; Lance Compa, Corporate Social
Responsibility and Workers'Rights, 30 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 1, 2-4 (2008); Richard M. Locke, Fei
Qin & Alberto Brause, Does Monitoring Improve Labor Standards: Lessons from Nike, 61 IND. & LAB.
REL. REv. 3, 5-6, 20-21 (2007).
6. See ESTLUND, supra note 3, at 6-7.
7. See GAY W. SEIDMAN, BEYOND THE BOYCOTT: LABOR RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND
TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISM 140 (2007) (arguing that in the long run, government labor inspectors
enforcing national laws will be more effective instruments for worker protection than even well-
intentioned NGO monitors). As complements to corporate coregulation and monitoring, government
inspection and private enforcement may be mutually reinforcing.
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company's own employees and its corporate suppliers; and whether the
commitment is accompanied by a disclaimer.
Part III discusses key shortcomings to the codes as self-regulatory
operations. It identifies both external and internal obstacles to successful
monitoring, including monitoring by independent entities. Part II
recognizes that private rights of action may carry counterveiling costs, but it
contends they may also be an essential complement if corporate codes are to
promote FOA in effective terms.
Part IV identifies eight potential causes of action to enforce corporate
code provisions related to FOA. It explores a range of state and federal
claims that could be asserted under U.S. law by employees, consumers, or
investors. The treatment of these claims is necessarily preliminary.
Although there are various obstacles to surviving motions to dismiss,
several approaches appear to hold promise. Moreover, a preliminary set of
analyses may be fruitful in two respects. First, they focus on the need for
protection beyond voluntary corporate efforts, as MNCs continue to
promote their codes in self-regulatory terms. Second, the analyses seek to
deepen the conversation as to which corporate code audiences are best
situated to pursue such protection in the courts.
II. DIVERSITY OF CODE FORMULATIONS ON FREEDOM OF
ASSOCIATION
A. Using Codes As a Branding Resource
Corporate codes initially arose in response to instances of business and
financial malfeasance that violated federal statutes.' Subsequently, under
pressure from labor and human rights groups, firms adopted labor standards
codes and accepted some forms of outside monitoring devised by NGOs or
public-private partnerships.9 In the past two decades, MNCs have applied
internally developed codes-featuring voluntary creation, compliance, and
enforcement - to the issue of labor standards for their global production and
supply chains.10 National laws in developing countries are often weak on
8. See Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Minimizing Corporate Civil And Criminal
Liability: A Second Look at Corporate Codes of Conduct, 78 GEO. L. J. 1559, 1580-98 (1990)
(discussing the development of codes in response to antitrust, foreign corrupt practice, and insider
trading scandals from 1950s to 1980s).
9. See generally Richard Locke, Matthew Amengual & Ashley Mangla, Virtue out of Necessity?
Compliance, Commitment and the Improvement of Labor Conditions in Global Supply Chains, 37 POL.
& Soc'y 319, 322 (2009); Dara O'Rourke, Outsourcing Regulation: Analyzing Nongovernmental
Systems ofLabor Standards and Monitoring, 31 POL'Y STUD. J. 1, 6-11 (2003).
10. There are also external codes addressed to labor standards that are promulgated by trade
associations, trade union confederations, and other nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). See
SEIDMAN, supra note 7, at 2-10; O'Rourke, supra note 9, at 6-11. The Article refers to these codes on
occasion, but its focus is on codes developed by individual corporations.
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paper and in practice with respect to potentially exploitative conditions
involving child labor, sexual discrimination, wages and hours, safety and
health, and FOA. In this context, corporate codes reflect both the good
intentions and the self-interest of their sponsors.
Codes serve as an important reputational asset, especially with
consumers and investors." A growing number of individual consumers,
along with influential institutional players such as universities and local
governments, want to do business with companies that espouse socially
responsible or "sweat-free" production practices.' 2 Public pension funds
and socially conscious mutual funds also can create pressure on companies
to declare publicly their commitment to humane working conditions.13
Moreover, faced with chronic underenforcement of worker protection laws
due to scarce government resources, regulators may effectively decide to
accept responsible corporate self-regulation as an alternative to their own
top-down enforcement efforts.' 4
In many parts of the world, factory-level employees of MNCs or their
suppliers are not in a position to choose jobs based on the social
responsibility profile of their employer. Still, a commitment to promulgate
and publicize a code means there will be corporate professional employees
whose job it is to deliver on that commitment by facilitating transparency,
enhancing communication within the company, and developing new forms
of accountability. For those individuals, presumably part of a division
within human resource operations, the code is both an asset that helps to
recruit and retain them as employees and a tool that enables them to
reinforce efforts by socially responsible consumers and investors.15
11. See Adam Lindgreen et al., Introduction: Corporate Social Responsibility Implementation, 85
J. BUS. ETHICS 251, 251 (2009); Jane C. Hong, Note, Enforcement of Corporate Codes of Conduct:
Finding a Private Right ofAction for International Laborers Against MNCs for Labor Rights Violations,
19 WiS. INT'L L. J. 41, 47 (2000)
12. The Worker Rights Consortium (WRC), an independent labor rights monitoring organization,
is supported by over 175 college and university affiliates. WRC focuses primarily on the workplace
practices of factories producing university-related apparel, although it also has done independent
monitoring on apparel factory standards for the City of Los Angeles. See generally WORKER RIGHTS
CONSORTIUM, http://www.workersrights.org (last visited May 31, 2012).
13. See DAVID VOGEL, THE MARKET FOR VIRTUE: THE POTENTIAL AND LIMITS OF CORPORATE
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 35-45, 61-66 (2005); Henry L. Petersen & Harrie Vredenburg, Morals or
Economics? Institutional Investor Preferences for Social Responsibility, 90 J. BUS. ETHICS 1, 12-13
(2009); S. Prakash Sethi, Investing in Socially Responsible Companies Is a Must for Public Pension
Funds - Because There Is No Better Alternative, 56 J. Bus. ETHICS 99, 102-03, 114 (2005).
14. See ESTLUND, supra note 3, at 14-19.
15. See, e.g., Alison Maitland, Sewing a Seam of Worker Democracy in China, FIN. TIMES, Dec.
12, 2002, at 14 (reporting on Reebok experiment to train Chinese workers to participate in free trade
union elections, under supervision of Reebok's Director of Human Rights Programmes). See generally
Moses L. Pava, Why Corporations Should Not Abandon Social Responsibility, 83 J. BUS. ETHICS 805,
812 (2008); lvanka Mamic, Managing Global Supply Chain: The Sports Footwear, Apparel and Retail
Sectors, 59 J. BUS. ETHICS 81, 90-92 (2005).
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For all of these reasons, MNCs have adopted and promoted codes on
their corporate websites. Most codes are presented with aesthetic
considerations in mind: they feature extensive graphic design work and are
replete with colorful illustrations.16 They also are readily accessible
through Google by typing in the corporate name and "Code of Conduct."
One may reasonably infer that these codes are meant to reach a wide
audience, including both consumers and investors.
In the summer of 2011, I reviewed the web-posted codes of twenty-
seven MNCs.17 My primary focus was on FOA and collective bargaining.
Most posted codes include some form of commitment to recognize
employee rights in this area.' 8  There is, however, considerable variation
with regard to the specific terms of that recognition.1 9
B. Invoking ILO Conventions and Principles
Approximately one-fourth of the codes explicitly invoke International
Labor Organization (ILO) conventions or principles covering FOA. The
language closest to an unconditional embrace is found in the Nestle
Corporate Business Principles, where Nestle declares: "We adhere to the
eight fundamental Conventions of the International Labour Organisation
(ILO)[,]" noting in particular Convention 87.20 The same code section
proclaims "We uphold the freedom of association and the effective
recognition of the right to collective bargaining" and adds: "Where our own
principles and regulations are stricter than local legislation, the higher
standard applies[.]"21
16. See, e.g., Proctor & Gamble, Our Values and Policies; L'Ordal, Code ofBusiness Ethics; Shell,
Code of Conduct; General Electric, The Spirit and the Letter. Full references to these and all other MNC
codes reviewed for the Article appear in the Appendix. See infra note 17.
17. The twenty-seven codes reviewed were promulgated by Adidas Group, American Eagle,
Citigroup, Coca Cola, Deutsch Telecom Group (DTG, which owns T-Mobile), Deutsch Post DHL,
General Electric, Goodyear, G4S (Wackenhutt), Hanesbrands, Heineken, IKEA, Krispy Kreme, L'Ordal,
Motorola, Nestle, NIKE, Pepsico, Proctor & Gamble, Russell Athletics, Shell, Siemens, Sodexo,
TESCO, Tim Hortons, Unilever, and Walt Disney. Melanie Luthern, Ohio State Univ. Moritz College
of Law Class of 2012, provided outstanding assistance researching and analyzing these websites. The
sites are listed individually in an Appendix. They are referenced in the footnotes to Part II.B. and the
rest of the Article.
18. My sample of U.S. websites was not scientifically selected. By comparison, among large U.K.
corporations, 64% of codes covering labor standards for suppliers include FOA. See Preuss, supra note
4, at 739.
19. Other scholars have identified variation in how FOA is covered under individual corporate
codes. See id; Xiaomin Yu, From Passive Beneficiary to Active Stakeholder: Workers'Participation in
CRS Movement Against Labor Abuses, 87 J. BUS. ETHICS 233, 236 (2009) (describing variable FOA
coverage in athletic footwear industry).
20. See Human Rights and Labour Practices, in NESTLE CORPORATE BUSINESS PRINCIPLES 9
(June 2010), http://www.research.nestle.com/asset-libraries/Documents/Corporate-Business-Principles-
EN.pdf (emphasis added). ILO Convention 87 covers Freedom of Association.
21. Id (emphasis added).
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Other MNCs that invoke ILO conventions use softer language,
avoiding a declaration of adherence. Thus one MNC "expects its
employees, suppliers and business partners around the globe to recognize
and apply particularly" core ILO conventions, 22 while a second MNC
declares its "support [for] the four fundamental principles in the [ILO]
Declaration." 23 And there are still weaker formulations: a code is "based
on international agreements and guidelines, including" ILO conventions,24
or "the principles embodied in our Code are designed to be consistent with
[ILO] core conventions." 25
The ILO conventions are addressed primarily to member governments
and not directly to corporate actors. Nonetheless, the core conventions in
particular are widely perceived as benchmarks for human rights in the
global workplace. 26  MNCs that invoke core ILO conventions - dealing
with child labor, forced labor, and nondiscrimination as well as FOA and
collective bargaining - seek to create a socially responsible label that will
appeal to global consumers and investors.
C. Expressing a Commitment to FOA
Almost every code reviewed includes some form of express
commitment to recognize or respect FOA and collective bargaining.27 The
22. SIEMENS, BUSINESS CONDUCT GUIDELINES 27 (July 2005), http://www.siemens.com/
responsibility/report/07/pool/pdf/business conductguidelines-e.pdf
23. G4S BUSINESS ETHICS POLICY 8, http://www.g4s.com/en/Social%2OResponsibility/
Safeguarding%20our/o20integrity/-/media/Files/Corporate%20Files/g4s business ethics policy.ashx
(last visited June 5, 2012). The 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work
reinforces international commitment to the four principles and associated rights considered essential for
social justice: freedom of association and collective bargaining; the elimination of forced labor; the
abolition of child labor; and the elimination of discrimination in employment. See RULES OF THE GAME:
A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS 93 (2009 ed.), http://www.ilo.org/
wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed norm/---normes/documents/publication/wcms_108393.pdf.
24. Code of Conduct, DEUTSCHE POST DHL, http://www.dp-dhl.com/en/about-us/code of
conduct.html (last visited June 5, 2012).
25. Code of Conduct for Manufacturers, THE WALT DISNEY COMPANY, 1, http://corporate.disney.
go.com/corporate/compliance/pdf/english.pdf (last visited June 5, 2012). See also STATEMENT ON
HUMAN RIGHTS, CITI, http://www.citigroup.com/citi/citizen/humanrights/index.htm (Aug. 2009) ("We .
. . are guided by fundamental principles of human rights, such as those in . . . the . . . ILO Code
Conventions.").
26. See, e.g., Janice Bellace, The ILO Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work,
17 INT'L J. COMP. LAB. L. & IND. REL. 269 (2001); Jill Murray, Labour Rights/Corporate
Responsibilities: The Role of ILO Labour Standards, in CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND LABOUR
RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 31-40. For examples of ILO involvement in the monitoring of corporate
compliance with labor standards, see Michael Posner & Justine Nolan, Can Codes of Conduct Play a
Role in Promoting Workers' Rights?, in INTERNATIONAL LABOR STANDARDS: GLOBALIZATION,
TRADE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 207, 223 (Robert J. Flanagan & William B. Gould eds., 2003).
27. I could not find any such reference in Shell's Corporate Code of Conduct. Additionally,
Pepsico and Unilever discuss freedom of association expectations but do not mention collective
bargaining. Levi-Strauss is another MNC (not reviewed here) with a code that fails to recognize FOA or
collective bargaining. See Hong, supra note 11, at 52. Despite the exceptions, and the fact that the
twenty-seven codes examined here may not be fully representative, it is evident that corporate codes
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strongest expressions are presented without deference to the constraints
identified under national or local laws. Apart from Nestle's declaration
discussed above, IKEA's code specifies simply that its suppliers "shall
ensure that workers are not prevented from associating freely" and "shall
not prevent workers from exercising collective bargaining activities."28
In the great majority of instances, MNC codes link FOA recognition to
what is allowable under local law. Codes recognize rights to FOA and
collective bargaining "unless otherwise prohibited by law," 29 "to the extent
permitted by the laws of the manufacturing country," 30 "in accordance with
local law,"3' or "within the framework of respective countries' laws and
regulations." 32 Given that a number of countries in the developing world
impose restrictions on independent trade unions and collective bargaining,33
the commitment to recognize employee FOA rights may be substantially
diluted.
Occasionally, a corporation pledges to take affirmative action in the
face of local legal constraints. Goodyear recognizes employees' right to
"bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing" and
adds that where FOA and collective bargaining "are restricted under law ...
the company shall facilitate open communication and direct engagement"
between employees and managers. 34  More often, MNCs combine
recognition of FOA rights as a general matter with an expression of respect
for the laws of the countries in which they operate. 35 It is notable that the
qualifier referring to what is consistent with local law occurs for FOA with
now devote substantially more attention to FOA than was true ten years earlier. See Kathryn Gordon &
Maiko Miyake, Deciphering Codes of Corporate Conduct: A Review of Their Contents 3, 14 (Org.
Econ. Co-Operation & Dev., Working Paper on Int'l Inv. No.199/2, 1999) (reporting that only 29.7% of
the codes dealing with labor standards mentioned FOA).
28. IWA Y Standard: Minimum Requirements for Environmental and Social & Working Conditions
When Purchasing Products, Materials and Services, IKEA 17 (June 4, 2008), http://www.ikea.com
Ims/enUS/aboutikea/pdflSCGlobal IWAYSTDVers4.pdf [hereinafter IWAY Standard]. The code
also specifies that it is based on the eight core ILO Conventions. See id at 1.
29. Supplier Code of Conduct, MOTOROLA 2, http://responsibility.motorola.com/index.php/
suppliers/scoc/ (last visited June 5, 2012).
30. NIKE, INC., CODE OF CONDUCT 1 (Aug. 2010), available at http://nikeinc.com/pages
/compliance.
31. PROCTOR & GAMBLE, OUR WORLDWIDE BUSINESS CONDUCT MANUAL 10, http://www.pg.
com/enUS/downloads/company/govemance/Policy_WorldwideBusinessConductManual.pdf (last
visited June 5, 2012).
32. DTG, CODE OF CONDUCT 7 (2009).
33. See, e.g., INT'L LABOUR OFFICE, REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL, FREEDOM OF
ASSOCIATION IN PRACTICE: LESSONS LEARNED 12 (2008), http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/
public/@dgreports/@dcomm/documents/publication/wcms_096122.pdf (discussing history of FOA
restrictions in Belarus); Ruben J. Garcia, Labor's Fragile Freedom ofAssociation Post-9/11, 8 U. Pa. J.
Lab. & Emp't L. 283, 292 (2006) (discussing history of FOA restrictions in China, Myanmar, and
Indonesia).
34. GOODYEAR, BUSINESS CONDUCT MANUAL 34-35 (May 2009), http://www.goodyear.com/
investor/pdf/corpgov/business conduct manual.pdf.
35. See L'ORtAL, THE CODE OF BUSINESS ETHICS: THE WAY WE WORK 5 (2007),
http://www.loreal.com/_en/_ww/html/company/pdf/codeof ethics us.pdf.
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greater frequency than for other fundamental protections such as those
involving forced labor or nondiscrimination.
One further aspect of code commitments regarding FOA is that some
MNCs express respect for the right to refrain along with the right to
associate. Sodexo has both a Supplier Code of Conduct and a Human
Rights Policy. For its own employees, Sodexo's policy recognizes the right
"to unionize or not to unionize"; by contrast, Sodexo's code simply directs
suppliers to recognize their employees' rights to FOA and to collective
bargaining.36 Other corporations also specify a right to refrain either with
respect to their suppliers' employees or for all employees including their
own.37
D. Prohibiting Discrimination Based on Union Activity
Almost all MNC codes prohibit discrimination against employees
based on a list of specified characteristics such as gender, race, religion,
national origin, age, or disability. The list of prohibited factors sometimes
includes trade union affiliation or activity.3 More often, union status or
conduct is omitted although it may be covered by a catchall phrase at the
end of the list such as "or any other legally protected factor."4 0
The tendency to omit FOA as a specified legally protectable factor is
interesting for two reasons. First, the list of factors is often long enough to
appear exhaustive, suggesting that FOA's omission may not be inadvertent.
Given the number of countries that restrict FOA and collective bargaining
rights, many MNCs may have opted for a low-profile approach. Second,
the list of factors often includes characteristics or traits that are not
protected against private employer discrimination under U.S. national law,
such as sexual orientation, political opinion, or philosophical opinion.41
Inclusion of these factors, which are highly controversial in many
36. Compare SODEXO, POLICY ON HUMAN RIGHTS 5-6 (Jan. 2009), http://www.sodexo
usa.com/usen/Images/Human%20rights-engtcm87-243749.pdf [hereinafter POLICY ON HUMAN
RIGHTS] with Supplier Code of Conduct, SODEXO, http://www.sodexousa.com/usen/
citizenship/diversity/suppliercodelsuppliercode.asp (last visited June 5, 2012). In its Policy on Human
Rights, Sodexo discusses its "positive relationship with a large number of unions" in North America.
POLICY ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra at 6.
37. See Supplier Code of Conduct, supra note 29, at 2; PROCTOR & GAMBLE, supra note 31.
38. See, e.g., ]WAY Standard, supra note 28, at 17; KRISPY KREME DOUGHNUTS, INC., CODE OF
BUSINESS CONDUCT AND ETHICS 5 (Dec. 4, 2007), available at http://investor.krispykreme.com/
phoenix.zhtml?c=120929&p-irol-govconduct; PROCTOR & GAMBLE, supra note 31, at 9; TIM
HORTONS, STANDARDS OF BUSINESS PRACTICES 8, http://www.timhortons.com/us/pdflSOBPFi
nal (9).pdf (last visited June 5, 2012).
39. See NIKE, INC., supra note 30, at 1; L'ORAL, supra note 35, at 18.
40. PROCTOR & GAMBLE, supra note 31. See also IWAY Standard, supra note 28 ("or any other
basis"); KRISPY KREME DOUGHNUTS, INC., supra note 38 ("or any other fact prohibited by law"); TIM
HORTONS, supra note 38 ("or any other status protected by law").
41. All six codes in notes 38 and 39 list sexual orientation; three list political opinion; one lists
philosophical opinion.
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developing countries, suggests that MNCs are prepared to transcend the
restrictions of national law and practice for some forms of discrimination
though not others.
E. Adopting Distinct Approaches for Suppliers
Corporations address the topic of freedom of association more directly
and decisively for their suppliers than they do for their own employees.
Some MNCs promulgate and post codes of conduct only for their suppliers
or contract factories.42 Many MNCs develop separate codes for suppliers
and for their own workforce, addressing FOA with respect to the former
group but not the latter.4 3 Corporations with separate codes for their own
workforce cover a range of business topics such as conflicts of interest,
insider trading, and accounts and record keeping. But they typically also
address worker protections other than FOA, including nondiscrimination,
employee safety and health, and employee privacy.44
Even corporations that address FOA protections for both suppliers and
their own employees may well accord greater protection to the employees
of their suppliers and contractors. As noted above, Sodexo recognizes its
own employees' right to refrain from joining a union but it does not include
right-to-refrain language for its suppliers.45 Other code language more
subtly distinguishes between FOA protections for supplier employees and a
corporation's own workforce. 46
42. See, e.g., NIKE, INC., supra note 30; Supplier Code of Conduct, MOTOROLA, supra note 29;
Code of Conduct for Manufacturers, THE WALT DISNEY COMPANY, supra note 25.
43. Compare e.g., TESCO CORP., CODE OF CONDUCT, http://www.tescocorp.com/data/l/ree docs/
562_TESCO%20Code%20of%20Conduct.Final.08.05.19.pdf (last visited June 5, 2012) (covering
corporate employees) with ETI Base Code, ETHICAL TRADING INITIATIVE, http://www.ethicaltrade.org
/eti-base-code (last visited June 5, 2012) (covering TESCO suppliers). Compare Our Worldwide Code
of Conduct. PEPSICO, http://www.pepsico.com/Company/Worldwide-Code-of-Conduct.html (last visited
June 5, 2012) (covering corporate employees) with Supplier Code of Conduct, PEPSICO,
http://www.pepsico.com/Purpose/Responsible-Sourcing/Supplier-Code-of-Conduct.html (last visited
June 5, 2012); Code of Ethics, AMERICAN EAGLE (covering corporate employees) with Vendor Code of
Conduct, AMERICAN EAGLE, http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtmlc=81256&p=irol-Vendor
Conduct (last visited June 5, 2012); Adidas Group Code of Conduct, http://www.adidas-group.com/
en/investorrelations/corporate govemance/codeofconduct/default.aspx (last visited June 5, 2012)
(covering corporate employees) with ADIDAS GROUP, WORKPLACE STANDARDS (Jan. 2007),
http://www.adidas-group.com/en/sustainability/assets/workplace-standards/english-workplace%20
standards.pdf (covering contractors and suppliers).
44. See, e.g., TESCO CORP., supra note 43, at 6 (addressing nondiscrimination and privacy); Our
Worldwide Code of Conduct, PEPSICO, supra note 43, at 1-2 (addressing nondiscrimination, privacy and
employee health and safety); Code of Ethics, AMERICAN EAGLE, supra note 43, at 4-5 (addressing
nondiscrimination); Adidas Group Code of Conduct, supra note 43, at 3 (addressing nondiscrimination
nd privacy).
45. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
46. Compare HANESBRAND, INC., GLOBAL CODE OF CONDUCT 8 (2011), available at
http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=200600&p-irol-govConduct (employees' right to exercise
lawful rights of FOA and collective bargaining) with HANESBRAND, INC., GLOBAL STANDARDS FOR
SUPPLIERS 6 (2006) (declaring that suppliers will respect their employees right to exercise rights of FOA
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It is hardly surprising that MNCs devote a disproportionate amount of
their FOA attention to the workplace practices of their suppliers and
contractors. Global supply chains are located principally in developing
countries, where exploitation is a greater threat. Workers in these countries
are hired into low-wage, arduous positions, they have no job security, and
their contractor employers rarely provide human resource counseling or
support. In addition, these workers operate under a regulatory structure that
too often features severely understaffed labor inspectorates and remote or
dysfunctional court systems.47
By contrast, an MNC's own employees are relatively well-paid, and
they have access to established professional HR departments. MNC
worksites tend to be located in Europe, the United States, or some other
developed country, where strong legal systems include a longstanding and
adequately funded labor regulatory structure. Enforcement may at times
yield results that are less than satisfying to affected workers, but the
domestic regulatory structure remains a meaningful option. For all of these
reasons, effective implementation of corporate codes assumes special
urgency with respect to workers employed by MNC contractors and
suppliers in developing countries.
It remains somewhat puzzling, however, that many companies are
unwilling to pledge the same level of FOA protection for their own
employees that they invoke for suppliers and contractors. One could argue
that given the hard-law restrictions on FOA confronting many suppliers in
the developing world, FOA protections would be at least as explicit for
MNCs' own employees located primarily in Europe and North America. 48
Once again, the diminished respect for FOA - when contrasted with
corporate pledges to uphold several other workplace standards for their own
employees - suggests a more pervasive level of discomfort regarding
employees' rights to join a union and engage in collective bargaining.
F. Inserting Disclaimers
Because corporate codes contain high-profile commitments to a range
of worker protections, one might anticipate the inclusion of prominent
and collective bargaining, with no reference to what is "lawful"). As was true for ILO standards, Nestle
is an outlier: it holds suppliers to a less rigorous standard than it demands of itself. Compare supra
notes 19-20 and accompanying text (own employees) with THE NESTL SUPPLIER CODE 2 (Aug. 2010),
http://www.nestle.com/Common/NestleDocuments/Documents/Library/Documents/Suppliers/Supplier-
Code-English.pdf (stating that suppliers should grant FOA and collective bargaining rights to their
employees "unless prevented by governmental policies or norms".)
47. See generally, Janice Fine & Jennifer Gordon, Strenghthening Labor Standards Enforcement
Through Partnerships with Workers' Organizations, 38 POL. & Soc'Y 552 (2010); Locke, Amengual &
Mangla, supra note 9.
48. In this regard, see Nestl6's practices described in note 46, supra.
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disclaimers in these documents. In fact, fewer than one-fourth of the codes
reviewed here include any disclaimer at all.49 Where disclaimers are
present, most are not prominently or conspicuously displayed, and they tend
to use legalese rather than straightforward language.s0 It is quite possible
that these disclaimers would be ineffective as a matter of law under the
fairly rigorous standards applicable in many state courts.51
Upon reflection, it is not so odd that disclaimers are either nonexistent
or insufficiently conspicuous and clear. Corporate codes are aimed
primarily at consumers and investors, not at employees. A prominent
disclaimer might erode consumer confidence that MNCs are genuinely
committed to socially responsible behavior, and it might deter investment
by socially conscious mutual funds. In addition, a clear and conspicuous
disclaimer would presumably attract unwanted attention from human rights
groups, NGOs, or trade unions. Resulting allegations of deception or
hypocrisy could lead to negative media response, influencing a broader
group of investors and consumers who rely on third parties for such
information. 52
Moreover, disclaimers may be perceived as unnecessary with respect
to employees of MNCs or their contractors. The language expressing
corporate commitments to decent labor standards is often sufficiently
vague, soft, or conditional so as to render these "commitments" tenuous. I
return to this issue in Part III.
G. Summary Observations
This Part demonstrates that MNCs rely on a broad range of different
approaches when declaring support for FOA and collective bargaining in
their corporate codes. Among codes reviewed here, Nestl6 is the gold
49. See KRISPY KREME DOUGHNUTS, INC., supra note 38, at 11; TIM HORTONS, supra note 38, at
3; CITI, supra note 25, at 3; GOODYEAR, supra note 34, at 2; MOTOROLA MOBILITY, BUSINESS
CONDUCT: OUR ETHICS, OUR CULTURE, OUR COMMITMENT, 4 (2011), available at http://responsibility.
motorola.com/index.php/overview/busconduct/cobc/.
50. On prominence, Krispy Kreme's disclaimer is on page 11 of a 12-page document, using bold
type face but the same font size as other sentences. Tim Horton's is on page 3 of a 41-page manual,
using the same font size without bolding or underlining. Motorola's is on page 4 of a 22-page
document, appearing as a sentence embedded in a more general paragraph. See supra note 49. On
clarity, Krispy Kreme, Tim Horton's, and Goodyear discuss the noncreation of contractual rights, the
existence of at will employment relationships, and the company's right, at its sole discretion, to change
any policy or procedure to the extent permitted or required by law. See id. Motorola more breezily
asserts: "The code is by no means a comprehensive manual or contract that addresses every situation
that we may encounter around the world." MOTOROLA MOBILITY, supra note 49.
51. See, e.g., Nicosia v. Wakefem, 643 A.2d 554 (N.J. 1994); McDonald v. Mobil Coal Producing,
Inc., 820 P.2d. 986 (Wyo. 1991); Jones v. Cent. Peninsula Gen. Hosp., 779 P.2d 783 (Alaska 1989).
52. Cf Kevin Banks & Elizabeth Shilton, Error! Main Document Only.Corporate Commitments
to Freedom of Association: Is There a Role for Enforcement Under Canadian Law?, 33 Comp. Lab. L.
& Pol'y J. 493, 509-20 (2012) (discussing incentives and disincentives for a properly worded
disclaimer).
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standard in two key respects: a commitment to recognize FOA rights as set
forth in the core ILO convention addressed to that subject, and an insistence
that corporate standards trump more restrictive protections in local laws.
Other codes are less assertive on both items: they refer to ILO conventions
in generalized and aspirational terms, and they accept the restrictions of
local laws as part of their own FOA declarations. 53
There are other variations among MNCs with respect to language on
nondiscrimination, distinctive treatment of suppliers, and use of
disclaimers. Notwithstanding such differences, one might ask how much
they matter to target audiences. It is not clear that consumers or investors
or even NGOs regularly distinguish between vague, feel-good declarations
and commitments expressed in more precise and therefore potentially
accountable terms. A related question involves what might happen if
Nestl6-type language became the norm. Would a more hard-edged
commitment linked explicitly to ILO standards result in greater
accountability through monitoring, by corporations themselves or
alternatively by NGOs? Might adoption of Nestl6-type language on a broad
scale lead to meaningful enforcement actions by or on behalf of interested
parties such as employees, consumers, or investors?
In seeking answers to these questions, the precise terms of FOA code
formulations would seem more important than has previously been
addressed. Many observers agree that codes can be effectively monitored
and enforced only when workers play an active internal role, for reasons
discussed in Part II below. But unless corporate suppliers make an
unequivocal commitment to respect FOA, very few workers will ever play
that role. Even with such an unequivocal commitment, code compliance
may well also require the option of outside enforcement by other
stakeholders. For employees in low-wage jobs on the bottom rungs of
global supply chains, fear of reprisal is an inevitable presence. Consumers
and investors occupy a more promising position as initiators because they
are not burdened with the severe power imbalance of such an employment
relationship.
At the same time, if options for private litigation are to be subsidiary
as opposed to primary, internal monitoring and enforcement must become
more effective. Worker participation - anchored in genuine respect for
FOA - is a vital prerequisite to enhance this interior focus. And if FOA as
a standard is to carry real weight, it must be set forth in terms that give rise
to reasonably specific and accountable expectations rather than simply
broadly understood principles and aspirations.
53. For an argument that companies should go beyond local law restrictions in their monitoring
and compliance efforts, see Montgomery & Maggio, supra note 4, at 216.
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Before attempting to address issues of more precise accountability and
private causes of action, it is relevant to examine how MNCs are
performing in practice. If self-regulation works reasonably well, then
contemplating separate lawsuits seems unnecessary. As Part II explains,
however, there are serious shortcomings with the self-regulatory approach
to code compliance, and these shortcomings warrant recourse to a
complementary strategy.
III. PROBLEMS WITH CORPORATE SELF-ENFORCEMENT
A. Frequent FOA Noncompliance in United States
Although the surveyed corporate codes include some form of pledge to
recognize FOA and collective bargaining, such pledges reflect
commitments in principle. Review of National Labor Relations Board and
federal court case law from 2000-2011, along with reports from NGOs,
academics, and the media, make clear that corporations often fail to comply
with such commitments in the United States. A handful of examples suffice
to illustrate the gap between website representation and worksite reality.
TESCO opened its first U.S. subsidiary store, Fresh & Easy, in 2007.54
The company is a charter member of the Ethical Trading Initiative, which
has a code requiring respect for FOA and collective bargaining,55 but Fresh
& Easy has committed numerous unfair labor practices directed at union
activity. It maintained an unlawful no-distribution rule at one location and
an unlawful rule prohibiting employees from discussing the union at
another store.56 It also unlawfully interrogated employees and engaged in
unlawful retaliations resulting in at least one election being rerun.5 7  The
number of violations in a short time period is not altogether surprising
given that the company had advertised for an employee relations director
who would be responsible for "maintaining non-union status and union
avoidance activities."58
54. See generally, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, A STRANGE CASE: VIOLATIONS OF WORKERS'
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION IN THE UNITED STATES BY EUROPEAN MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 80
(Sept. 3, 2010), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2010/09/02/strange-case [hereinafter A
STRANGE CASE].
55. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
56. See Fresh & Easy Neighborhood Market, Inc. and UFCW International Union, 356 NLRB No.
85, 2011 NLRB Lexis 28, at *2 (Jan. 31, 2011) (unlawful nondistribution rule); id. at *2, * (unlawful
rule prohibiting employees from discussing union).
57. See id. at *51-*53 (unlawful interrogation and surveillance); Judge Throws Out Union Vote at
Fresh & Easy Supplier, SUPERMARKET NEWS, July 21, 2010, http://super marketnews.com/latest-
news/judge-throws-out-union-vote-fresh-easy-supplier (reporting on unlawful firing and coercion by
Fresh & Easy supplier, subsequently acquired by the company).
58. See A STRANGE CASE, supra, at 54 (citing Financial Times story from 2006).
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Sodexo recognizes FOA and collective bargaining in its Human Rights
Policy and its Code of Conduct.59 Yet it too has committed multiple NLRA
infractions during recent organizing campaigns. These include various
threats, interrogations, and promised benefits in violation of § 8(a)(1);
discharge of striking workers and other employees in violation of § 8(a)(3);
disparate enforcement of its distribution and solicitation policy; and
unlawful refusal to bargain.60 In addition, Sodexo managers have engaged
in conduct that is legal under the NLRA but conflicts with its Human Rights
Policy statement that it "respects our employees' right to organize or not to
organize as they may so choose" as part of "Respecting international labor
standards." 61 This conduct includes holding captive audience meetings,
using supervisors to engage in anti-union communications with individual
employees, and invoking the specter of permanent replacement for
employees considering a strike. 62
Similar narratives exist regarding interference with FOA for other
corporations discussed in Part I. The NLRB has issued numerous
complaints or found violations since 2000 against Deutsche Telekom's U.S.
subsidiary (T-Mobile), against G4S's U.S. subsidiary (Wackenhut
Security), against Siemens, and against DHL. It does not follow that these
companies are "worse actors" than corporations without codes of conduct.
But because the corporations described here proclaim their support for high
FOA standards, and because they routinely recognize and negotiate with
worker representatives as part of their European operations, the persistent
and aggressive pursuit of union avoidance strategies in the United States is
notable.
Concern over corporate self-regulatory efforts extends to labor
standards besides FOA. One of the largest apparel companies in the United
States trumpeted its private monitoring program to the media for a six-year
period in the 1990s even as federal and state labor inspectors repeatedly
found that its contractors violated minimum wage and overtime laws,
59. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
60. See generally Sodexho Am. & Local 471, Hotel, Motel & Restaurant Emps. & Bartenders
Union, 2004 NLRB Lexis 440, at * 14 (Aug. 6, 2004); Commercial Linen Exchange, Div. Sodexho Corp.
& UNITE, 2004 NLRB Lexis 110, at *71, *106 (Mar. 3, 2004); Sodexho Marriott Serv. & Local 79,
SEIU, 335 NLRB 538, 2001 NLRB Lexis 687 (Aug. 27, 2001); A STRANGE CASE, supra note 54, at 61-
77.
61. See POLICY ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 36, at 6.
62. See generally A STRANGE CASE, supra note 54, at 60.
63. See generally JOHN LOGAN, LOWERING THE BAR OR SETTING THE STANDARD? DEUTSCHE
TELECOM'S U.S. LABOR PRACTICES (Dec. 2009), http://laborcenter.berkeley.edullaborlaw/
deutschetelekom09.pdf, A STRANGE CASE, supra note 54, at 21-34 (Deutsche Telecom and T-Mobile);
id at 35-46 (DHL and its parent corporation, Deutsche Post); id. at 87-100 (Wackenhut and its parent
corporation G4S); id. at 115-20 (Siemens).
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depriving employees of millions of dollars in back wages." Despite Labor
Department pressure on garment retailers to develop effective private
monitoring programs, there remain widespread problems detecting and
remedying wage and hour violations by manufacturers and contractors.6 5
In some respects, U.S. employees' experience with corporate self-
regulation has less in common with self-monitoring in Europe than with the
track record of voluntary compliance programs in developing countries.
One recent NGO report summarized stories from five countries about
workers being deprived of FOA and other workplace protections by
Sodexo, a corporation with a prominently displayed code. The workers
were from the Dominican Republic, Colombia, Guinea, Morocco, and the
United States. 66 Moreover, U.S. unions seeking to promote negotiation of
international framework agreements with MNCs are coming to view ILO
standards as integral to securing FOA in a robust form. 67
The core shortcomings of corporate self-regulation, however, do not
derive from U.S. experience. The U.S. regulatory landscape includes a
professional labor standards bureaucracy, independent and active trade
unions, an engaged cohort of scholars, and a reasonably attentive media
community. The presence of these groups promotes a certain level of
information flow, transparency, and critical perspective on corporate efforts
at self-regulation. The more serious challenges for voluntary compliance
programs arise with respect to suppliers and contactors in the developing
world. Apart from workers' meager levels of compensation, and inadequate
regulatory systems that undermine their willingness to speak out,68 global
supply chains operate with a far lower degree of transparency and in the
context of a far thinner knowledge base about actual working conditions.
These suppliers provide the proper focus to review code applications in a
self-regulatory setting.
64. ESBENSHADE, supra note 1, at 1-3 (describing practices of GUESS? Inc., and its contractors in
Los Angeles).
65. See id. at 85-86 (garment workers in highly monitored shops in Los Angeles were unlawfully
deprived of $63 million in 2000); see also ESTLUND, supra note 3, at 64-68 (discussing widespread
noncompliance with and underenforcement of workplace laws regulating wages, hours, and health and
safety); see generally David Weil, Public Enforcement/Private Monitoring: Evaluating a New
Approach to Regulating the Minimum Wage, 58 INDuS. & LAB. REL. REV. 238 (2004).
66. See TRANSAFRICA FORUM, VOICES FOR CHANGE: SODEXO WORKERS FROM FIVE COUNTRIES
SPEAK OUT (Dec. 21, 2010), http://tulane.usas.org/files/2011/01/20110118transafrica~report.pdf.
67. See, e.g., Susan R. Hobbs, Sodexo Agreement with Union Federation Covers 391,000
Employees Worldwide, 26 LAB. REL. WEEK (BNA) 97 (2012) (reporting on International Framework
Agreement (IFA) between Sodexo and International Union of Food Workers that covers 391,000
workers including 18,000 in United States). The IFA text includes a commitment from Sodexo to
respect the ILO's 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (art. 3.2) and a
separate article detailing the meaning of the parties' agreement on FOA (art.5).
68. See supra text accompanying note 47.
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B. Structural Shortcomings of a Voluntary Compliance Approach
Codes of conduct require some form of meaningful monitoring to
avoid becoming at best a feel-good statement of corporate hopes and at
worst an outright sham. The primary approach to monitoring has been
internal: MNCs create human rights departments or divisions to do some or
all of the following: visit worksites, interview managers and workers, check
time cards and payroll records, review regularly filed compliance reports,
provide advice on compliance problems, and recommend corrective
action.69 This kind of internal monitoring, however well-intentioned, has
serious flaws when applied to global suppliers.
Worksite visits tend to be announced ahead of time. Advance notice is
the norm because companies wish to minimize disruptions in factory or
contractor production and also to assure that authorized accountants or other
experts are on site to help with review of payroll and related records. But
announced visits mean that suppliers or contractors are able to prepare in
advance: to modify the books, minimize or conceal worksite hazards, and
assure that workers on the shop floor are "well-prepared" to meet with
auditors or inspectors.70 It is not uncommon for suppliers to maintain
double sets of books so as to deceive auditors, and to hand out scripts that
employees can memorize and recite when interviewed.'
With or without such worker scripts, auditors' interviews are usually
brief and likely conducted on site at the plant. They may take place in a
private office or conference room rather than on the shop floor, but the
identities of those interviewed are known to management. Predictably,
these workers are subjected to, or they reasonably anticipate, threats and
intimidation. Local laws do not protect against employer retaliation, and
there is little opportunity for workers to develop a trust relationship with the
auditors who in any event are unlikely to have labor standards training and
expertise.7 Employees in these circumstances are understandably fearful to
provide answers that would be most relevant regarding their day to day
experiences and perceptions of working conditions. The likelihood of
69. See generally ESBENSHADE, supra note 1, at 70-80; Montgomery & Maggio, supra note 4, at
203.
70. See ESBENSHADE supra note 1, at 71-74; Ben Jiang, Implementing Supplier Codes of Conduct
in Global Supply Chains: Process Explanations from Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives, 85 J.
BUS. ETHICS 77,77 (2009); Locke, Amengual & Mangla, supra note 9, at 328.
71. See Dexter Roberts et al., Secrets, Lies, and Sweatshops, Bus. WEEK, Nov. 27, 2006 (reporting
on these practices at numerous Chinese factories); Jiang, supra note 70, at 77; Auditing Working
Conditions, ETHICAL TRADE INITIATIVE, http://www.ethicaltrade.orglin-action/issues/auditing-working-
conditions (last visited June 6, 2012).
72. See Mark Barenberg, Toward a Democratic Model of Transnational Labour Monitoring?, in
REGULATING LABOUR IN THE WAKE OF GLOBALIZATION 37, 40 (Brian Bercusson & Cynthia Estlund
eds., 2008).
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cursory responses and withheld information further vitiates the monitoring
process.
In addition, the MNC factory audit often suffers from a conceptual
weakness. Because it tends to be modeled on company financial audits,
factory monitoring relies primarily on review of myriad documentary
records, not on time-consuming investigation of shop-floor processes and
lengthy worker interviews.73 In this regard, corporate auditors' training and
orientation may be peculiarly ill-suited to identify code violations involving
labor-management relations in general and FOA in particular. A recent
influential study concluded that most auditors interviewed by the authors
had training in HR management or in operations, and accordingly were
"more likely to notice and report on blocked aisles, uncharged fire
extinguishers, and irregular personnel records rather than worker or union
harassment [or] illegal firings ... 74
Underlying many of these weaknesses is an inherent tension between
corporations' principled espousal of labor standards and their pragmatic
insistence on price-driven competition among suppliers. Senior executives
tend to care more about earnings and profit margins than about human
rights issues. Global suppliers in apparel, footwear, handicrafts, and other
labor-intensive industries understand that because corporate management
negotiates primarily on price, suppliers must keep costs low in order to
compete successfully for business.75 As a result, many suppliers choose to
operate outside the soft regulatory framework, to minimize attention to their
approach by restricting their employees' FOA, and to conceal this
arrangement from the MNCs with which they do business. 76 And many
MNCs continue to do business with noncomplying suppliers, either from
choice or perceived necessity.77
These serious problems of objectivity and transparency may be
alleviated to some degree if monitoring is truly independent. An outside
monitoring enterprise is more likely to rely on unannounced site visits, to
engage neutral experts for record review, and to interview workers away
from the worksite where they should feel less intimidated. Importantly, the
73. See Locke, Amengual & Mangla, supra note 9, at 332.
74. Id. at 333.
75. See Mischa Gaus, Students vs. Sweatshops, Round III-The Designated Supplier Program
Targets College Clothing Companies, INT'L LAB. RTS. F. (July 31, 2006), http://www.labor
rights.org/print/1 1153 (discussing pressures on suppliers to hold production costs down by exploiting
workers); see generally Jack Nash, Do Codes of Conduct Promote Unethical Sourcing?, JUST-STYLE
(Apr. 2, 2001), http://www.just-style.com/analysis/do-codes-of-conduct-promote-unethical-sourcing
id92610.aspx.
76. See generally Isabel Hilton, Made in China, 89 GRANTA, Spring 2005, at 13; Debra Cohen
Maryanov, Note, Sweatshop Liability and Corporate Codes of Conduct and the Governance of Labor
Standards in the International Supply Chain, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 397, 409-10 (2010); Nash,
supra note 75.
77. See Locke, Amengual & Mangla, supra note 9, at 335.
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independent monitor's success in contacting and communicating with
workers away from the plant is likely dependent on the active involvement
of a local trade union or labor NGO.
Even for independent monitors and auditors, however, there remain
genuine obstacles. The opaque web of subcontracting relationships often
includes short-term agreements and constant shifting between suppliers.79
The complex arrangements for payroll and benefits distributions may be
similarly difficult to penetrate. Employees may be unwilling to share
critical information or perceptions absent a strong local workers'
organization on the ground. A clear system of sanctions also must be in
place for use against code violators, something that requires initiative and
leadership from corporate managers rather than outside monitors.80
Moreover, factories that respond to an external audit by complying
with code standards face a short-term competitive disadvantage. They may
react by closing and then relocating production to begin anew the process of
evading costly labor requirements.81  Such relocations mean that workers
who are the victims of code violations experience job loss as their
"remedy."
Finally, a corporation that is determined to monitor rigorously -
whether on its own or through independent audits - may still have only
limited leverage over its suppliers. For apparel and other consumer goods
production, MNCs typically outsource to hundreds if not thousands of
facilities. Their share of production in any given factory may be at most
10% to 15% of that factory's overall output. In such circumstances, a
single company that seeks to impose compliance with FOA or other core
78. See Barenberg, supra note 72, at 41-42 (discussing operation of Worker Rights Consortium
(WRC) monitoring teams, which maximize participation by local worker and community representatives
while excluding plant workers or union officials seeking to organize the factory). The WRC is
described supra note 12.
79. See TEARING APART AT THE SEAMS: How WIDESPREAD USE OF FIXED-DURATION
CONTRACTS THREATENS CAMBODIAN WORKERS AND THE CAMBODIAN GARMENT INDUSTRY, ALLARD
K. LOWENSTEIN INT'L HUMAN RTS. CLINIC (Apr. 2011), http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/
IntellectualLife/Cambodia_TearingApartattheSeams.pdf (reporting that Cambodian garment industry's
increasing use of short-term employment contracts threatens to roll back labor rights progress); Jiang,
supra note 70, at 78 (stating that long-term contracts are an important prerequisite to improve suppliers'
labor standards performance); O'Rourke, supra note 9, at 21-22 (emphasizing firm's ability to move
production rapidly and to hide behind multiple layers of ownership).
80. See generally Lars-Eric Petersen & Franciska Krings, Are Ethical Codes of Conduct Toothless
Tigers for Dealing with Employment Discrimination?, 85 J. BUS. ETHICS 501, 504, 509 (2009).
81. In Indonesia, an investigation by the WRC resulted in substantial improvements to employee
working conditions. The factory was then closed in 2010, and management took steps to blacklist
employee union leaders with other local area employers. See WRC Factory Investigation: Kwangduk
Langgeng, WORKER RIGHTS CONSORTIUM, http://www.workersrights.org/Freports/Kwangduk%20Lang
geng.asp, (last visited June 6, 2012). A comparable scenario played out for workers at a factory in the
Dominican Republic. Management responded to a WRC investigation, recognized a free trade union,
then relocated production to other facilities and closed the plant in 2007. See WRC Factory
Investigation: BJ&B, WORKER RIGHTS CONSORTIUM, http://www.workersrights.org/Freports/bjandb.
asp (last visited June 6, 2012).
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labor standards by severing ties with the factory loses even its limited
amount of leverage. Because suppliers as factory owners will be reluctant
to compromise their competitive position at the behest of one customer,
they may well be unwilling to do the right thing. 82
The range of obstacles confronting self-enforcement efforts does not
mean corporations are incapable of making genuine progress. Professor
Cynthia Estlund has cogently described the rise of regulated self-regulation
in the workplace, observing that corporate efforts have grown steadily
stronger since the 1990s and that the trend toward such self-regulation
seems here to stay. 83  Moreover, there are modest success stories. Reebok
attracted favorable attention for its monitoring in the 1990s, which included
assigning company personnel to observe inside its supplier plants;
deploying audit teams from corporate headquarters to visit and evaluate;
and relying on an independent accounting firm as well.84 Since the 1990s,
Nike has made significant efforts to improve working conditions among its
suppliers.85
In the end, however, even the most aggressive self-monitoring
programs cannot be enough on their own. A recent NGO critique reported
that despite improvements in MNC efforts, there remain serious problems
with the basic auditing approach in place.86 A more recent study of a well-
known global apparel company revealed pervasive violations of code
provisions addressed to FOA, overtime and work hours, and safety and
health; these violations were widespread among the company's suppliers in
Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East.87 Aptly summarizing the current
state of affairs, an in-depth report on Nike's monitoring efforts concluded
that they produced at best mixed results:
82. See generally, Locke, Amengual & Mangla, supra note 9, at 326. The WRC proposal known
as the designated supplier program (DSP) encourages major apparel brands to concentrate corporate
control over working conditions. The DSP remains in the advanced planning stage; the Department of
Justice recently announced that it would not challenge the program on antitrust grounds. See Letter
from Sharis Pozen, Acting Assistant Attorney General, to Donald I. Baker, Worker Rts. Consortium
(Dec. 16, 2011), http://www.workersrights.org/dsp/Letter/20from%20DOJ%2012.16.2011 .pdf
83. See ESTLUND, supra note 3, at 75-95; see generally Harry Arthurs, Private Ordering and
Workers' Rights in the Global Economy: Corporate Codes of Conduct As a Regime of Labour Market
Regulation, in LABOUR LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION 471 (Joanne Conaghan et al. eds., 2000).
84. See Lance Compa & Tashia Hinchcliffe-Darricarrere, Enforcing International Labor Rights
Through Corporate Codes of Conduct, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 663, 682-83 (1995); Yu, supra
note 19, at 241-47.
85. See Locke, Qin & Brause, supra note 5.
86. See CLEAN CLOTHES CAMPAIGN, LOOKING FOR A QUICK FIX: How WEAK SOCIAL AUDITING
Is KEEPING WORKERS IN SWEATSHOPS 12-33 (2005), http://www.cleanclothesorg/documents/05-
quick fix.pdf (reporting that audit approach used by large retailers like Walmart in eight countries
marginalizes workers and their organizations, relies on unskilled and inexperienced auditing staff,
invites widespread deception perpetrated by factory managers, and lacks effective remediation follow-
up); Auditing Working Conditions, supra note 71.
87. See Locke, Amengual & Mangla, supra note 9, at 330-31.
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After years spent by Nike developing ever more comprehensive
monitoring tools, hiring growing numbers of internal compliance
specialists, conducting hundreds and hundreds of factory audits, and
working with external consultants and NGOs, analyses of the company's
own data suggest that conditions have improved somewhat in some of
its suppliers but either stagnated or deteriorated in many others. 8
C. The Complementary Value of Judicial Enforcement
Before exploring specific cause-of-action options for employees,
consumers, and investors, it seems important to consider the overarching
justification for seeking to promote private enforcement. As reported by
numerous workplace scholars, MNCs in recent decades have
institutionalized their self-regulatory approach to labor standards.89
Particularly for global industries involving apparel, footwear, and other
labor-intensive products, private and independent monitoring of suppliers'
compliance with corporate codes has become entrenched. Some academics
have expressed more optimism than others regarding this development,90
but the development itself shows no signs of abating.91
It is widely understood that meaningful code compliance by global
suppliers is unlikely without genuinely effective monitoring. For reasons
already discussed, a robust commitment to FOA seems essential to the
success of such monitoring.92 In addition, however, there is inevitably a
certain disconnect between monitoring and enforcement. Even the best set
of benchmarks and independent monitoring techniques may not be
sufficient, especially for a low-wage workforce that too often lacks key
support structures. Additional options may well be needed to spur
corporations to discipline or reorient their suppliers, and to incentivize
proactive code compliance efforts by suppliers themselves. One such
option is to think more creatively about private enforcement.
In this regard, a useful analogy is to the proliferation of whistleblower
causes of action. Over the past three decades, Congress and state
legislatures have enacted scores of provisions protecting whistleblowers
from employer retaliation.93 The key rationale for such protection is the
88. See Locke, Qin & Brause, supra note 5, at 21.
89. See generally ESBENSHADE, supra note 1; ESTLUND, supra note 3; ARCIHON FUNG ET AL., CAN
WE PUT AN END To SWEATSHOPS? (2001); SEIDMAN, supra note 7.
90. Compare e.g., FUNG ET AL., supra note 89 (relatively hopeful) with Dara O'Rourke,
Monitoring the Monitors: A Critique of Corporate Third-Party Labour Monitoring, in CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY AND LABOUR RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 196-208 (highly skeptical) and ESBENSHADE,
supra note 1 (same).
91. See ESTLUND,supra note 3, at 6-23.
92. See supra Part II.G.
93. See, e.g., Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801, 1855
(2006); Superfund Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601, 9610 (2006); Surface Transportation Assistance Act, 49
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important role of the private attorney-general. Any activity that justifies
government regulation to establish basic labor standards also warrants
protection for individuals who seek to ensure compliance with those
underlying standards. Given the challenge of discovering and remedying
hazardous or substandard conditions in today's U.S. workplaces, private
watchdog efforts have become an important contributor. Their role has
assumed more urgency due to the shrinking level of government
enforcement resources and the substantially diminished presence of trade
unions able to negotiate worker protections.
Like government regulation of labor conditions, corporate monitoring
of labor standards faces myriad obstacles including restricted access to
relevant information, lack of transparency, worker perceptions of
vulnerability, and inadequate resources for the task at hand. In this context,
private enforcement can serve as a complementary incentive to promote
compliance with core labor standards. To be sure, whistleblowers are
specifically protected by statute and are assisting in enforcement of
legislatively approved standards, whereas consumers, investors, or
employees might well be assisting in enforcement without such an express
legislative imprimatur. 94 But promoting enforcement of "soft law" can be
conceived of as extending beyond the boundaries of statutes and
regulations, as has occurred with respect to the widely recognized public
policy exception to employment at will.9s
Moreover, while corporate codes of conduct are not themselves
positive law, MNCs hope to reap rule-of-law-type advantages from their
promulgation. Corporations intend for targeted audiences to favor their
products in part because of reliance on these standards, and for government
regulators to minimize interventions in part based on internal compliance
with the standards. Under these circumstances, allowing private parties at
whom the codes are targeted to help enforce code commitments may well
be justified from a public policy standpoint.96
There are potential costs involved if private causes of action are
authorized and then pursued. We may see frivolous lawsuits or excessive
U.S.C. §§ 31100, 31105 (2006); Sarbanes Oxley Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2006); Michigan
Whistleblower Protection Act, M.C.L.A.§ 15.362 (2012).
94. There are some potential statutory causes of action. For example, for employees under the
Alien Tort Claims Act, for consumers under state false advertising laws, and for investors under Rule
lOb-5. See Part IV infra.
95. See, e.g., Gardner v. Loomis Armored, Inc., 913 P. 2d 377 (Wash. 1996); Gantt v. Sentry Ins.,
824 P.2d 680 (Cal. 1992); see generally CLYDE SUMMERS ET AL., LEGAL RIGHTS AND INTERESTS IN THE
WORKPLACE: STATUTORY SUPPLEMENT AND MATERIALS 179-92 (2007) (reporting all fifty states have
adopted some version of the public policy exception).
96. Cf Miriam F. Weisman, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: The Failure of the Self-
Regulatory Model of Corporate Governance in the Global Business Environment, 88 J. BUS. ETHICS
615, 625-26 (2009) (discussing shortcomings of a purely self-regulatory model when attempting to
eradicate bribery as a rational global market entry strategy).
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discovery requests that divert corporate resources from code enforcement.
Further, in the long run, worker interests may be more effectively
represented through corporate negotiations with trade unions and labor
NGOs than with hit-or-miss litigation. For instance, there may still be ways
to render global production efforts more responsive to codes though
designated suppliers or other closed-supply-chain efficiencies."7 But
whatever the costs, pervasive weaknesses in code compliance and
monitoring of global suppliers invite new inquiries regarding how to make
codes more than aspirational.
In order to explore possible options for private litigation, I have chosen
to reference certain FOA code language or approaches as a benchmark.
Part IV invokes the NestI6 language at various points because it is clear and
includes relatively little wriggle room. If causes of action cannot be
defended based on the strongest code language, the prospects for such
private enforcement seem bleak. On the other hand, to the extent certain
causes of action are deemed plausible or justified under the Nestld
provision, then interested consumers, investors, or NGOs may seek to
include comparable language in other codes.
IV. OPTIONS FOR PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF CODES
For purposes of this Part, I assume a corporate code that pledges
adherence to the ILO convention on FOA for both the parent corporation
and its suppliers. I assume further that there are serious questions regarding
the effectiveness of monitoring undertaken to assure compliance with code
provisions, including the provision related to FOA.
A. Causes ofAction by Employees
Employees may consider a number of theories to vindicate their FOA
protections. I briefly examine three such possibilities: enforcing the code
directly by relying on the employee handbook doctrine; asserting
employees' rights as third party beneficiaries of the parent-supplier
agreement; and, for employees who are not United States citizens, bringing
an action under the Alien Tort Claims Act.
1. Employee Handbook Doctrine
In the 1980s, state courts established that employer commitments on
job security, set forth with sufficient clarity in employee handbooks or
97. See designated supplier program discussed supra note 82; Designated Supplier Program
(DSP), WORKER RIGHTS CONSORTIuM, http://www.workersrights.org/dsp/ (last visited June 6, 2012)
(describing program in detail); see also ESBENSHADE, supra note 1, at 206.
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manuals, could be enforceable under a theory of unilateral contract.
These courts ruled that it was proper to presume employee knowledge and
reliance so long as the handbook was widely disseminated and the
employee continued to stay on the job.99 Courts applied unilateral contract
theory even though most employers issuing handbooks did not believe they
were extending a contractual offer and had no intention of so doing.
If corporate codes are viewed as analogous to employee handbooks,
then commitments to respect FOA - and ergo not to retaliate against
employees who assert FOA rights - could be viewed as enforceable. The
analogy, however, is far from perfect. Employees are the primary intended
recipients of handbooks, and in most cases they are actual recipients as
well. By contrast, corporate codes are aimed primarily at consumers and
investors rather than employees. Further, even in this electronic age, code
web postings may not be properly comparable to employee handbook
distributions that typically are combined with employee training and
orientation sessions. The comparison becomes still more remote for low-
wage employees outside the United States, who may have limited internet
access and also limited facility in English. Accordingly, presumptions of
employee knowledge and reliance are far more tenuous with respect to
corporate code provisions than employee handbooks.
Efforts to invoke the handbook doctrine to protect whistleblowers
under corporate codes of business conduct have met with little success in
the courts.10 Outcomes are due in part to the overly general language of
code anti-retaliation provisions, which courts deem not to qualify as a
specific employer promise.' 0 That concern could apply to aspects of FOA
code language as well. For instance, assertions that the corporation will not
tolerate harassment or retaliation against efforts to form a union may be
viewed as statements of values rather than actionable promises.102
98. See, e.g., Wooley v. Hoffman-LaRoche, 491 A.2d 1257 (N.J. 1985); Toussaint v. Blue Cross
& Blue Shield of Mic., 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980).
99. See Wooley, 491 A.2d at 1264-66; Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 892-93; Pine River State Bank v.
Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 626-30 (Minn. 1983). Not all state courts were this adventurous. See, e.g.,
Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co., 551 P.2d 779, 782 (Kan. 1976) (manual is a unilateral expression
of company policy the terms of which were not bargained for); Edwards v. Citibank N.A., 425 N.Y.S.
2d 327, 328-29 (App. Div. 1980) (manual does not create a unilateral obligation).
100. See generally Richard Moberly, Protecting Whistleblowers by Contract, 79 U. COLO. L. REV.
975, 1012-18 (2008).
101. See, e.g., Riel v. Morgan Stanley, No. 06 CV 524(TPG), 2007 WL 541955, at *6 (S.D.N.Y.
2007 Feb. 16, 2007) (refusing to enforce code provision stating that employer "will not tolerate any kind
of retaliation for" good faith whistleblower complaints); Adcox v. SCT Prods., No. OIAO1-9703-CV-
00123, 1997 WL 638275, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 17, 1997) (refusing to enforce code provision
holding managers responsible for a work environment where "constructive, frank, and open discussion
is encouraged and expected, without fear of retaliation").
102. Cf Belgasem v. Water Pik Techns., Inc., 457 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1220 (D. Colo. 2006) (refusing
to enforce antidiscrimination and anti-harassment policies in company's Ethics and Compliance
Guidelines).
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Beyond problems of language, however, courts regularly insist on
individualized employee reliance when assessing anti-retaliation statements
in corporate business codes.1 03 By requiring whistleblowers to allege and
establish actual reliance on the code commitment, courts have signaled their
doubts as to whether employees are the primary recipients for this
commitment. These doubts may well extend to the circumstances
surrounding labor standards code provisions as well.
2. Third-Party Beneficiary Doctrine
In Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,"' the Ninth Circuit dismissed a third-
party beneficiary claim brought by employees of Wal-Mart's foreign
suppliers located in Asia, Africa, and Central America. Plaintiffs contended
that Wal-Mart had promised its suppliers it would monitor their compliance
with the corporate code, and that as employees they were beneficiaries of
this promise. 05 After reviewing the language of Wal-Mart's code of
conduct for its suppliers, the court held that plaintiffs' claim failed for two
reasons. First, Wal-Mart did not make a promise to monitor suppliers and
therefore created no duty that could flow to employees as beneficiaries.1 06
Second, even if Wal-Mart had made such a promise, plaintiffs failed to
plead that it was the suppliers' intent as promisees to benefit their
employees through agreeing to follow the corporate code - the suppliers'
intent was more logically to benefit themselves.107
As the leading decision addressing possible enforcement by third-party
beneficiaries of corporate code commitments, Wal-Mart presents a
substantial challenge to employee causes of action. The court's key
reasoning is that under the language and structure of its supplier code, Wal-
Mart "reserved the right to inspect the suppliers, but did not adopt a duty to
inspect them." 0 8 Still, a differently worded code provision could give rise
to a duty of monitoring and inspection. Moreover, a promise to inspect can
be inferred from the circumstances surrounding a supplier contract as well
as from contract language.109
103. See Moberly, supra note 100, at 1017-18 and cases cited therein.
104. 572 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 2009).
105. Seeidat681.
106. See id at 681-82.
107. See id at 682. This second ground is more clearly articulated in the district court opinion
affirmed by the Ninth Circuit. See No. CV 05-7307 AG (MANx), 2007 WL 5975664, at *4 (C.D. Cal.
2007).
108. Id. at 681-82. The code language relied on by plaintiffs was part of a paragraph entitled
"Right of Inspection." Id. at 682.
109. See generally Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (Ct. App. N.Y. 1917). This
inference will be subject to each jurisdiction's parole evidence rule.
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In contrast to Wal-Mart, some courts have found a reservation of rights
to imply an affirmative duty sufficient to give rise to a third-party-
beneficiary cause of action. In one case, the Tenth Circuit held that an auto
racing association's contractual "right to cancel" race track events due to
"unsafe racing conditions" gave rise to an actionable duty to protect race car
drivers from a fire hazard at the track." 0 In another example, a New York
state court recognized that tenants and visitors could sue as intended
beneficiaries based on general language in an agreement between a security
company and a residential complex."' And courts have been willing to
sustain third-party actions in an employment setting if the contract language
is sufficiently specific regarding benefits accruing to employees, including
the benefit of a compliance and monitoring program.112
These cases suggest that the language of a code agreement may allow
for third-party actions stemming from a corporate commitment to have
suppliers recognize FOA and to monitor their FOA practices. Courts must
decide in specific circumstances whether code language demonstrates an
undertaking with employees as intended beneficiaries or merely a
reservation of rights or acknowledgement of general principles. Employees
as third parties need not establish individual reliance so long as they are
intended beneficiaries of the undertaking.11 3  In addition, and subject to
parole evidence rule restrictions, employees may seek to establish their
status as intended beneficiaries from the record surrounding code adoption.
This record could include corporate awareness of widespread FOA
problems in its industry or of public backlash due to employees being
mistreated generally by its suppliers.
The second prong of Wal-Mart was the court's conclusion that even if
the company's promise was sufficiently specific, its suppliers must have
entered into the code agreement for their own benefit rather than to benefit
their workers."14  One might argue, however, that although a promisee
I10. See Wolfgang v. Mid-America Motorsports, Inc., Ill F.3d 1515, 1524-25 (10th Cir. 1997).
111. See Kelly v. Norgate Bus. Ass'n, 2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 5196 U, at * 5-8. See also Ayala v. Bos.
Hous. Auth., 536 N.E.2d 1082, 1088-90 (Mass. 1989) (tenants of housing project were intended
beneficiaries of housing authority's contract with federal agency under which authority was to inspect
for lead paint hazards). Other state courts have agreed with the Wal-Mart court's conclusion that in
order to establish a third party beneficiary cause of action, the relevant contract language must evidence
a specific undertaking rather than recognition of general responsibilities. Gay v. Ga. Dep't of Corr., 606
S.E. 2d 53, 54-57 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004).
112. See Chen v. Street Beat Sportswear, Inc., 226 F. Supp. 2d 355, 361-65 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)
(garment workers were intended beneficiaries of compliance program agreement between clothing
manufacturer and Department of Labor); Prouty v. Gores Techn. Grp., 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 178, 180-85
(Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (former employees were intended beneficiaries of severance pay provisions in
purchase agreement between current and former employer companies, despite general clause disavowing
any rights to third parties).
113. See generally Ratzlaff v. Franz Foods of Ark., 468 S.W.2d 239, 241 (Ark. 1971); Boise
Cascade Corp. v. Pence, 394 P.2d 359, 361-62 (Wash. 1964).
114. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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supplier's primary intent in agreeing to a corporate code is to benefit itself,
it also knows - or should objectively be understood to recognize - that
agreement to the code will result in benefits to its employees. A promisee's
mixed motive or primarily self-interested motive for agreeing to the
contract is compatible with the contract also being intended to benefit third
parties."' And these third parties may be intended beneficiaries even if not
expressly mentioned or identified in the agreement."'
The fact that a supplier's noncompliance with corporate code
provisions has important consequences for supplier employees does not
mean that those employees' interests were part of the contemplated
arrangement between corporation and supplier. Still, although the Wal-
Mart decision signals judicial reluctance to regard employees as intended
beneficiaries of code agreements between MNCs and their suppliers, other
courts may be less skeptical about this prospect. Further, corporate code
language and the circumstances surrounding its adoption may diverge from
the Wal-Mart setting, permitting a more favorable result for employees. 117
In sum, the third-party-beneficiary theory appears somewhat promising for
employees when compared to the employee handbook doctrine.
3. Alien Tort Claims Act
The Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), part of the Judiciary Act of 1789,
provides that "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States.""' Scholars disagree as to the
precise original intent behind enactment of ATCA, but Congress's likely
interest was to assure foreign governments and merchants that the new
nation would take seriously those duties imposed by the law of nations.1 19
115. See Vidimos, Inc. v. Laser Lab. Ltd., 99 F.3d 217, 220 (7th Cir. 1996); Vikingstad v. Baggott,
282 P.2d 824, 826 (Wash. 1995). See generally 3 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON
CONTRACTS § 10.3 (2004).
116. Ratzlaff 468 S.W.2d at 241; Boise Cascade, 394 P.2d at 361-62; FARNSWORTH, supra note
115.
117. Admittedly, corporations faced with the possibility of third-party actions by employees may
choose to add clear and prominent disclaimer language to their codes. A suitably prominent statement
that employees are not meant to benefit in any specific way from the agreement between a corporation
and its suppliers may also undermine the faith of consumers and investors, and attract critical attention
from NGOs and the media. See supra Part II.F.
There may be procedural hurdles involving in personam jurisdiction and forum non conveniens
if the defendant is a foreign supplier or subsidiary of a U.S. corporation, or a corporation that is
headquartered in Europe. Those issues are beyond the scope of this Article. See generally Phillip I.
Blumberg, Asserting Human Rights Against Multinational Corporations Under United States Law:
Conceptual and Procedural Problems, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 493 (Fall 2002).
118. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006), originally codified at 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
119. See generally Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and The Judiciary Act of 1789: A
Badge of Honor, 83 AM. .J. INT'L L. 461, 464-82 (1989) (discussing different possible purposes for
ATCA).
580
HeinOnline  -- 33 Comp. Lab. L. & Pol'y J. 580 2011-2012
2012] ENVISIONING ENFORCEMENT OF FOA STANDARDS
Whatever its exact historical purpose, the Act was essentially dormant as a
basis for litigation from 1789 to 1980.120
Since the Second Circuit's 1980 decision in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,121
courts have sustained jurisdiction under ATCA with greater frequency. The
court in Filartiga held that under ATCA, the contemporary law of nations
extended to a foreign state's treatment of its own citizens and that the law
applied to prohibit torture sanctioned by a state government.122
Subsequently, in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,123 the Supreme Court indicated
that for ATCA jurisdiction to apply, the "[a]ctionable violations of
international law must be of a norm that is specific, universal, and
obligatory."l 24
For present purposes, a hypothesized ATCA claim would involve
allegations by alien workers that their employer - probably a foreign-based
supplier but perhaps a parent MNC - denied them protections and/or
punished them for attempting to engage in FOA. There are at least two
substantial obstacles to such a claim: whether ATCA allows for
enforcement against private actors such as corporations or only against state
actors, and whether FOA is a sufficiently universal and obligatory norm of
international law.125 Each obstacle implicates complex disagreements over
doctrine and policy, addressed only briefly here.
On the liability of corporate actors, the case law has been rapidly
developing. As set forth above, the statutory text confers jurisdiction for
torts in violation of international law without specifying or limiting the
identity of the perpetrator. The Second Circuit in 2010 held, over a forceful
contrary view, that ATCA does not extend to corporate actors because there
is no customary international standard holding corporations accountable for
human rights violations.' 26 Prior to the Second Circuit's Kiobel decision,
the Eleventh Circuit had ruled that corporations may be held liable for
violations of human rights, notably torture. 127  And in the past year, two
120. See Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Nicholas K. Mitrokostas, International Implications of the Alien
Tort Statute, 16 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 607, 609 (2004) (reporting ATCA was used at most twenty-one
times during this period, and only two cases upheld jurisdiction).
121 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
122. See id. at 881-85. The case was brought as a wrongful death action by the family of a
Paraguay citizen (Filartiga) who allegedly was kidnapped and tortured to death by the Paraguay
Inspector General of Police (Pena-Irela). The suit was filed when Filartiga's family members and the
former Inspector General were living in the United States. Id at 878-79.
123. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
124. Id. at 732 (internal citation omitted). The Court held that short term illegal detention of an
alien, followed by his transfer across the border and lawful arraignment, "violates no norm of customary
international law so well defined as to support the creation of a federal remedy." Id. at 738.
125. Once again, potential obstacles involving inpersonam jurisdiction or forum non conveniens are
beyond the scope of this Article. See supra note 117.
126. Compare Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F. 3d 111 120-21, 136-37 (2d Cir. 2010)
with id. at 150-52 (Leval, J., concurring in result).
127. See Romero v. Drummond Co. Inc., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (1lth Cir. 2008).
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other circuits have come down on the side of approving corporate
liability.128 The D.C. Circuit in particular concluded that the majority in
Kiobel had misunderstood ATCA's textual structure, history, and purpose
and had ignored the law on corporate liability from 1789 as well as the
Supreme Court's admonition in Sosa to follow federal common law. 129 The
Supreme Court will address the circuit court conflict,130 but to this point
lower courts are leaning in favor of allowing suitably framed ATCA claims
against corporate actors to proceed.
On the issue of what actions give rise to liability under ATCA,
however, employees asserting violations of FOA face an uphill battle.
Claims that have achieved traction under ATCA have involved human
rights violations sufficiently heinous to be deemed universal and obligatory
norms under international law. These have included acts of torture,'31
genocide,' 32 the use of forced labor, 133 and certain extreme forms of child
labor.1 34 It is doubtful that deprivations of FOA protection - which on their
face do not threaten the health and safety of affected individuals - would
similarly qualify as a "norm of international character accepted by the
civilized world." 35
The Seventh Circuit's recent decision in Flomo v. Firestone Natural
Rubber Co.136 suggests one possible approach for affected employees. In
reviewing whether Firestone's treatment of child labor on its rubber
plantation in Liberia violated customary international law, Judge Posner for
the court invoked the United Nations Convention on The Rights of the
Child and the two fundamental ILO Conventions addressed to child labor.
Noting that the United States had ratified only one of these three
conventions, the court observed that conventions not ratified by all nations
"can still be evidence of customary international law... . Otherwise every
128. See Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., 643 F. 3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2011); Doe v. Exxon Mobil
Corp, 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
129. See id at 39-55.
130. See Kiobel, 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011) (granting cert.). Following oral argument in February, 2012,
the case was restored to the calendar for re-argument in the 2012 Term. See 132 S.Ct. 1738 (2012).
131. See, e.g., Kiobel, 621 F. 3d at 120; id. at 155 (Leval, J. concurring in result); Aldana v. Del
Monte Fresh Produce, N.A. Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1250-53 (11th Cir. 2005); Hilao v. Estate of Marcos,
25 F. 3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994).
132. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F. 3d 232, 243-44 (2d Cir. 1995).
133. See, e.g., Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1074 (C.D. Cal. 2010); Adhikari v. Daoud
& Partners, 697 F. Supp. 2d 674, 687 (S.D. Tex. 2009); Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d
424,441 (D.N.J. 1999).
134. See, e.g., Nestle, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1075-76; Roe v. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d 988,
1020-21 (S.D. Ind. 2007).
135. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004). But cf. Estate of Valmore Lacamo
Rodriguez v. Drummond Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1264 (N.D. Ala. 2003) (finding that "the
fundamental rights to associate and organize support actionable torts under the ATCA").
136. 643 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2011).
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nation (or at least every "civilized" nation) would have veto power over
customary international law."l37
Although the United States has not ratified the core ILO Conventions
on FOA and collective bargaining, the vast majority of nations have done
so. This broad level of international acceptance compares favorably with
ratification levels for other "core" conventions."* When considered along
with additional international agreements recognizing the fundamental
nature of FOA, 139 courts may be willing to examine the contention that at
least certain deprivations of that right implicate customary international
law.
At the same time, the Supreme Court in Sosa offered multiple reasons
for setting a high bar against new private causes of action under ATCA. 140
One of these reasons, concern over foreign policy implications, might carry
special force in countries that do not allow free trade unions or collective
bargaining under their national laws. Moreover, unless FOA deprivations
are accompanied by acts of violence or physical harm from corporate
actors, or perhaps threats posing an imminent risk of such harm, they may
well not be regarded as sufficiently universal and obligatory. For these
reasons, it seems less likely that federal courts will find a loss of FOA
protections to be grounds for recovery under the statute.
B. Cause ofAction By Consumers: False Advertising
When a corporation in its code promises to abide by the dictates of
ILO Convention 87 and to require that its suppliers do so as well, some
consumers are likely to rely on these statements when determining which
goods or services to purchase. The issue becomes whether, in appropriate
circumstances, an action for false advertising can be brought by or on
137. Id. at 1021.
138. The FOA Convention has been ratified by 150 nations and the Collective Bargaining
convention by 160 nations. This closely approximates ratification levels for the Convention on the
Abolition of Forced Labor (169 nations), the Minimum Age Convention (160 nations), and the Worst
Forms of Child Labor Convention (174 nations). For data on ILO convention ratifications see ILOLEX:
DATABASE OF INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS, http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/newrat
frameE.htm (last visited June 6, 2012).
139. See, e.g., ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, International Labour
Organization, http://www.ilo.org/declarationlang--en/index.htm (last visited June 6, 2012); International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 8, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan.
3, 1976); The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (lII) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III)
(Dec. 10, 1948).
140. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724-28 (identifying as reasons for judicial caution: (i) reluctance to
expand the discretionary power ofjudges in this common law arena; (ii) recognition that common law in
general has become interstitial at most; (iii) preference that creating new private rights of action is best
left to legislative judgment; and (iv) concern over the potential implications for U.S. foreign relations
policy).
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behalf of consumers, and relatedly whether such an action should be limited
by First Amendment considerations.
More than forty states have laws regulating statements that the speaker
knows or reasonably should know to be false or misleading when such
statements are made with the intent to dispose of goods or services. 14 1 in
the leading case of Kasky v. Nike, Inc.,142 the California Supreme Court
held that false statements about its employees' labor conditions, made by
Nike in letters to its customers, were actionable under state law to prevent
consumer deception.' 43 In reaching its conclusion, the court held that even
though Nike was responding to publicly aired allegations about its
mistreatment of foreign workers, it was engaged in commercial rather than
noncommercial speech. The court relied on several factors: Nike was itself
a commercial speaker, its speech was aimed at a commercial audience
(university athletic departments that were major purchasers), and its factual
representations were commercial in nature (labor conditions in Nike
factories are part of the company's own business operations)." The U.S.
Supreme Court agreed to review the decision, and while the Court
ultimately remanded the case without deciding it, a number of Justices
expressed concern at what they saw as difficult First Amendment
questions.145
Are corporate codes commercial speech? One can argue that they are,
given how they are packaged (in a glossy advertising-type format with
elaborate graphic design and colorful illustrations) and how their message is
a recognizable form of puffery to the general public (describing the virtues
of their labor standards operation). Indeed, in contrast to Nike's press
releases and letters to newspaper editors and university athletic directors in
Kasky, corporate codes seem directed not at public-opinion-makers as part
of an ongoing exchange but rather at the commercial audience of consumers
and investors. When Nestle or Ikea extol their commitment to high labor
standards on their websites as a visible element of corporate identity, they
are invoking social responsibility as a marketing tool to boost product sales.
This form of unilateral self-promotion would seem to qualify as a type of
141. See David C. Vladeck, Lessons from a Story Untold: Nike v. Kasky Reconsidered, 54 CASE
W. RES. L. REv. 1049, 1079 (2004).
142. 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002).
143. Id. at 262.
144. Id. at 258.
145. See Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 655 (2003) (dismissing writ of certiorari as
improvidently granted); id at 663-64 (concurring opinion of Stevens, Ginsburg, Souter, JJ.); id at 672,
676-77 (Breyer & O'Connor, JJ., dissenting).
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advertising, albeit one focused on the attractiveness of a corporate image
rather than the utility of a corporate product.146
Are the codes actually or inherently misleading? Under California's
false advertising law, a plaintiff must show only that members of the public
are likely to be deceived under a "reasonable consumer" standard.147 New
York's law is somewhat less generous: a plaintiff must allege that the
advertisement had an impact on consumers at large, was deceptive or
misleading in a material way, and resulted in injury. 148
Whether reasonable consumers are likely to be deceived will require
code-specific analysis. A careful reading of text is needed to determine
whether a corporation is claiming to engage in the practices it states are
necessary and proper, or is merely espousing policy preferences it aims to
achieve. Provisions pledging FOA protections might be viewed as too
general or aspirational to be capable of deceiving a reasonable purchaser.
On the other hand, an unequivocally clear code commitment to respect
FOA regardless of local laws could be seen as deceptive if a corporation
produces most of its goods in a country like China that refuses to accept
independent labor organizations, if a corporation's factory supervisors
regularly punish employee attempts to form unions, or if a corporation
makes no serious effort to monitor the repressive FOA practices of its
suppliers.
For those jurisdictions requiring individualized proof of deception and
reliance, it may be necessary to establish that customer choice is dependent
on the presence of FOA protections. Consumers focused on promises of
socially responsible or sweat-free production seem more likely to be
attentive to code statements about child labor, forced labor, wage
minimums or overtime maximums than about the rights to unionize. Still,
one can imagine a class of concerned purchasers for whom FOA is salient
within a group of deceptively presented code protections on which they
relied.149
Finally, should state laws regulating the truth or falsity of corporate
code representations about labor conditions receive heightened First
146. See Tomi J. Kallio, Taboos in Corporate Social Responsibility Discourse, 74 J. BUS. ETHICS
165, 170 (2007); Vladeck, supra note 141, at 1084; Ronald K. L. Collins & David M. Skover,
Commerce and Communication, 71 TEX. L. REV. 697, 708-10 (1993).
147. See Colgan v. Leatherman Tool Grp. Inc., 135 Cal. App. 4th 663, 679-83 (Ct. App. 2006).
148. See DeAngelis v. Timberpeg East, Inc., 858 N.Y.S. 2d 410, 414 (App. Div. 2008). Other state
laws require proof that the deceptive practice proximately caused damage to plaintiff. See Barbara's
Sales Inc. v. Intel Corp., 879 N.E.2d 910, 919 (Ill. 2007) (noting conflict between Illinois and California
standards).
149. Consumers who are deceived by a product's advertising or marketing campaign into spending
money to purchase the product would appear to have standing, although assessing the amount of
monetary damages may be problematic. See generally Kwikset Corp. v. Sup. Ct. of Orange Cnty., 246
P.3d 877, 885-90 (Cal. 2011).
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Amendment scrutiny because such codes are inevitably "a blending of
commercial speech [with] noncommercial speech and debate on an issue of
public importance?"150  It can be argued that even if the codes are
economically motivated, and even if they are packaged in a public-relations
type format, a corporate presentation about labor conditions invites public
reaction and response to an ideologically-framed message. As such, codes
are contributing to debate on a matter of public concern and efforts to
regulate their content should be reviewed more rigorously than typical
commercial speech.'
Unlike the back and forth exchanges in the Nike case, however,
corporate codes are unilateral website presentations. Rather than initiating
or contributing to public debate, they are more accurately described as
efforts to declare that the companies promulgating them rely on "sweat-
free" or "human-rights-friendly" manufacturing processes. Whether such
declarations are actually or inherently misleading, potentially misleading, or
not at all misleading will depend on precise code language and specific state
law standards. But it is well settled that governments may regulate the
accuracy of corporate declarations about products being "made in the
U.S.A" 52 even though the country-of-origin issue is a matter of ideological
and political controversy. It is hard to see why corporate code declarations
about FOA or other labor standards should be analyzed differently from a
consumer protection standpoint. 153
C. Causes ofAction by Investors
Like employees, investors may pursue different legal approaches in an
effort to assure the provision of FOA protections. Investors, however, do
not experience labor standards first-hand. Instead, their code-related claims
will likely focus on top corporate management's role in overseeing or
monitoring code implementation. I briefly examine four possible claims:
an action pursuant to Rule lOb-5 of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act; a
150. Nike, 539 U.S at 663 (Breyer & O'Connor, JJ., dissenting).
151. See generally DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 576 (1988);
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 104 (1940); Brief of Amicus AFL-CIO at 5-17, Nike Inc. v. Kasky,
539 U.S. 654 (2003).
152. At the state government level, see Leatherman Tool Group, 135 Cal. App 4th at 679-83;
Kwikset Corp., 246 P.3d at 889-90. At the federal government level, see for example United States v.
Stanley Works, No. 3; OB CV 883 (JBA) (D. Conn. 2006) (consent decree ordering $205,000 civil
penalty to settle charges under Federal Trade Commission Act that company falsely claimed its ratchets
were made in United States); In re Jore Corp., 131 F.T.C. 585 (2001) (consent order enjoining deceptive
made-in-U.S.A. claims for power tool accessories).
153. California state law appears especially hospitable in light of state supreme court rulings in Nike
Inc. and Kwikset Corp. Whether the FTC would pursue such claims, as it has done for deceptive
advertising with respect to "made in the U.S.A." labels, may be in part a function of how scarce
enforcement resources are allocated.
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statutory action under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act; a common law
claim for failure of oversight by the board of directors under the
Caremark54 decision and its progeny; and a claim pursuant to Rule 14a-8
of the federal proxy rules.
1. SEC Rule lOb-5
Under Securites and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule lOb-5,15
promulgated pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, it is unlawful
to make a false statement of material fact or to omit to state a material fact
in connection with the sale or purchase of securities. The existence of an
implied private right of action under lOb-5 is well-established,156 as are the
basic elements of such a private securities fraud claim: a material
misrepresentation or omission, made with scienter and relied on by the
purchaser or seller, that causes economic loss.157
Assuming a MNC has made material misstatements or omissions
related to its own or its suppliers' labor practices, a private cause of action
would face substantial obstacles. One challenge is establishing scienter,
probably through smoking-gun type evidence indicating that a corporate
official intentionally or recklessly misstated or omitted a material fact. The
existence of media reports highlighting FOA practices by suppliers that
violate MNC code standards is not enough on its own. Such reports may
well reflect good faith failures to enforce standards or even negligent
monitoring, but in either case conduct that falls well short of scienter.
Equally if not more important is the difficulty of establishing loss
causation. The alleged misstatement or omission about labor practices must
be significant enough to affect the value of the security so that the market
price drops when the true state of affairs is disclosed. Assuming arguendo
that top corporate officials concealed evidence of FOA violations at
supplier factories, investors must still demonstrate that this misconduct
impacted the bottom line-presumably because NGOs or the media shined
light on the events, information flows influenced investor confidence, and
the stock price went down. In this regard, the drop in price must be
traceable to the particular misstatement or omission.158
In short, although egregious misstatements or omissions in the
monitoring context may turn out to be actionable under 1 Ob-5, private
154. In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
155. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011).
156. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 & n. 10 (1983).
157. See Dura Pharm. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341 (2005).
158. Id. at 342-43 (observing that lower price "may reflect, not the earlier misrepresentation, but
changed economic circumstances, changed investor expectations, new industry-specific or firm-specific
facts, conditions, or other events . . . .").
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investors seeking to bring claims for such fraudulent or deceitful conduct
regarding labor practices face a high barrier. 5 9
2. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Congress in 1977 passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)160
to target corruption by requiring inter alia that publicly traded companies
maintain accurate books and accounts.161 As part of its bookkeeping
requirements, the Act specifies that companies must "devise and maintain a
system of internal accounting controls." 62  Federal courts have regularly
held that there is no scienter requirement for establishing civil liability
under these bookkeeping provisions.163  The FCPA bookkeeping and
internal controls section also lacks a requirement of materiality.' 64 Thus, in
theory, a corporation's minor inadequacy in operating its internal
monitoring controls could give rise to liability under the Act.
There are, however, two large problems in seeking to allege that a
company's failure to monitor FOA code compliance may trigger an investor
cause of action under the FCPA. One is that the statute lacks a private right
of action. Because courts have regularly held that there is no private action
under the FCPA bookkeeping provisions,'6 5  it is only the federal
government that might use these provisions to enforce monitoring of
corporate labor standards codes.
A second problem, if anything more serious, is that judicial
interpretation of the phrase "internal accounting controls" has focused on
maintenance of financial information while ignoring substantive or
performance-based data.16 6  This focus is understandable given that
159. Government enforcement actions under 1Ob-5 are somewhat easier because reliance and loss
causation do not apply to SEC civil enforcement actions. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Pirate Investor, LLC, 580
F.3d 233, 239 n.10 (4th Cir. 2009). The SEC must still establish scienter; in addition, the agency's
enforcement priorities are subject to the constraint of limited resources. See also supra note 153
(discussing possible impact of limited FTC resources).
160. Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78 m(b), (d)(1),
(g), (h), 78 dd-1, 78dd-2, 78dd-3, 78ff (2006)).
161. See 15 U.S.C. §78m (a), (b).
162. 15 U.S.C. § 78 m (b) (2) (B).
163. See, e.g., McConville v. S.E.C., 465 F.3d 780, 789 (7th Cir. 2006); S.E.C. v. McNulty, 137
F.3d 732, 740-41 (2d Cir. 1998); S.E.C. v. World-Wide Coin Inv. Ltd., 567 F. Supp. 724, 749 (N.D. Ga.
1983).
164. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Thielbar, No. Civ. 06-4253, 2007 WL 2903948 at *10 (D.S.D. Sept. 28,
2007); World-Wide Coin, 567 F. Supp. at 748-50.
165. See, e.g., In re Remec, Inc. Sec. Litig., 388 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1177 (S.D. Cal. 2005); Davis v.
DCB Fin. Corp., 259 F. Supp. 2d 664, 673 (S.D. Ohio 2003); Nat'l Semiconductor Corp. v. Sporek, 612
F. Supp. 1316, 1326-34 (N.D. Cal. 1945). Federal courts also have held there is no private right of
action under the FCPA's antibribery provisions. See Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024, 1027-
30 (6th Cir. 1990); Scientific Drilling Ass'n v. Gyrodata Corp., 215 F.3d 1351, *3-*4 (unpublished
opinion) (Fed. Cir. 1999).
166. See, e.g., McConville, 465 F.3d at 790; World- Wide Coin, 567 F. Supp. at 750-51.
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Congress's major concern in the Act was with deterring bribes by U.S.
companies to foreign officials.'67 I have not found any case in which the
federal government invoked the bookkeeping and internal controls
provision with reference to a corporation's performance audits or other
nonfinancial monitoring.168 Thus, despite the FCPA's strict auditing
requirements and low barriers to liability, it is unlikely that investors or the
federal government can invoke the Act's bookkeeping provisions to enforce
monitoring of corporate labor standards.
3. Failure to Monitor Under Caremark
In Caremark, a 1996 Delaware Chancery Court decision, 169
shareholders argued that the board of directors' failure actively to monitor
corporate performance subjected the corporation to substantial legal
liability. 70 The court held that a board of directors has a duty to ensure that
"appropriate information and reporting systems are established by
management,""' systems that:
[A]re reasonably designed to provide to senior management and to the
board itself timely, accurate information sufficient to allow management
and the board, each within its scope, to reach informed judgments
concerning both the corporation's compliance with law and its business
performance. 72
In doctrinal terms, it would seem that investors may bring Caremark
claims based on the corporation's inadequate monitoring of known business
risks.' 73  Although a number of post-Caremark decisions have involved
challenges to monitoring and compliance programs in the context of civil or
criminal liability,17 4  the Caremark test envisions holding directors
accountable for oversight failures related to business performance as well as
law compliance. 75
167. See generally World-Wide Coin, 567 F. Supp. at 746.
168. Cf Freuler v. Parker, 803 F. Supp. 2d 630, 641-42 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (shareholder derivative
action alleges inter alia that failure to maintain internal controls related to culture of bribery by its
employees, agents, and contractors damaged company reputation and required company to incur
substantial investigatory costs; complaint dismissed on other grounds).
169. See supra note 154.
170. See Caremark, 698 A.2d at 963-64. The civil complaint was filed the day after a federal grand
jury indicted Caremark for making illegal payments to healthcare providers in exchange for referrals of
Medicare or Medicaid recipients. See id. at 962-63.
171. Id. at 969-70.
172. Id. at 970 (emphasis added).
173. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise Risk Management, 34 J. CoRP. L. 967,
968 (2009).
174. See, e.g., Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006); White v. Panic, 793 A.2d 356 (Del. Ch.
2000).
175. See generally In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 772-79 (Del. Ch. 2005)
(alleging failure of oversight related to lucrative severance payments to CEO who was terminated after
fourteen months); In re Citigroup Inc. S'holder Deriv. Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 121-35 (Del Ch. 2009)
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To be sure, it is not easy to prevail on a Caremark claim under
Delaware precedent. The Caremark court itself declared that the theory of
directors violating their duty to be "active monitors of corporate
performance" is "possibly the most difficult theory in corporation law upon
which plaintiff might hope to win a judgment."176  The alleged failure of
oversight must be pleaded with particularity regarding the inadequacy of the
board's monitoring mechanisms; these allegations should reflect what
amounts to a conscious decision by directors to ignore their oversight
responsibilities. 77
Still, the Delaware courts have made clear that there are paths to
recovery under Caremark. A decision to ignore oversight responsibilities
may be predicated on the board of directors having not created an important
supervisory structure such as a monitoring committee, or on the
committee's having failed to meet after being formally constituted.17 1 In
addition, and importantly, the good faith oversight obligation requires that
directors pay appropriate attention to information enabling them to spot
"red flags"7 9 As explained by one corporate scholar, red flag situations -
pointing to a flaw in an internal compliance system or a problem outside the
system - may arise due to a single dramatic incident or a series of more
modest episodes over a period of time.s18  Shareholder allegations of
directors' failure to spot red flags may be sufficient to survive motions to
dismiss in appropriate factual settings. 81
(alleging failure of oversight related to inadequate protection from exposure to subprime lending
market).
176. In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996).
177. See Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 126-29; Stone, 911 A. 2d at 370-73; see generally Andrew S.
Gold, The New Concept of Loyalty in Corporate Law, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 457 (2009); Hilary A.
Sale, Monitoring Caremark's Good Faith, 32 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 719 (2007). There is some uncertainty as
to whether the directors' oversight duty under Caremark is a duty of loyalty or a duty of care. See
generally Martin Petrin, Assessing Delaware's Oversight Jurisprudence: A Policy and Theory
Perspective, 5 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 433 (2011); Bainbridge, supra note 173, at 975. Whatever its
doctrinal foundation, the Caremark duty arguably precludes as a defense both the business judgment
rule and the exculpatory charter provisions identified in § 102(b)(7) of the Delaware corporations
statute. See Canadian Commercial Workers Indus. Pension v. Alden, No. Civ.A. 1184-N, 2006 WL
456786, at *6 (Del. Ch. Feb. 22, 2006); Bainbridge, supra note 173, at 975; Petrin, supra, at 449.
Additionally, Caremark complaints in which there was no pre-suit demand submitted to the board of
directors must allege particularized facts sufficient to excuse this failure by plaintiffs. See White, 793
A.2d at 356; Stone, 911 A.2d at 362; DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1(a). Debates surrounding these doctrinal
issues are beyond the scope of this Article.
178. See Shaev Profit Sharing Account v. Armstrong, No. Civ. A. 1449-N, 2006 WL 391931 at *5
& n.13 (Del. Ch. Feb. 13, 2006) (citing cases). For a case in which the Chancery Court imposed
liability on directors for the total absence of internal controls, see ATR-Kim Eng. Fin. Corp. v. Araneta,
No. CIV.A. 489-N, 2006 WL 3783520 (Del. Ch. Dec. 21, 2006), aff'd930 A. 2d 928 (Del. 2007).
179. See Shaev, 2006 WL 391931; Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 507 (Del. Ch. 2003).
180. See Sale, supra note 177, at 733. See also Bainbridge, supra note 173, at 985.
181. See In re Abbott Labs. Derivatives S'holders Litig., 325 F.3d 795, 805-06 (7th Cir. 2003)
(analyzing directors' "unconsidered inaction" under Caremark); McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808, 817-18
(6th Cir. 2001) (same).
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How might the "ignoring red flags" theory apply with respect to labor
standards codes? Assume arguendo it is well known in the global apparel
or athletic shoe or toy industries that suppliers frequently maintain duplicate
books to deceive auditors about wage and hour irregularities, and that they
script or intimidate workers to avoid detection of their refusal to respect
FOA. A corporation may be ignoring red flags when it continues to rely on
the same porous monitoring approach. Thus, for instance, when directors
allow managers to conduct only five percent of performance audits
unannounced, although it is widely known that unannounced audits yield
more accurate and complete information, that conduct may support
shareholders' red-flag assertions.
The red flag assessment may be affected by a wide range of factors.
Should directors pay attention to the oversight problems of other companies
in the industry as well as their own company's track record? If industry-
wide monitoring problems have existed for years, or if the media exposes
them in dramatic terms, does that increase the obligation upon directors to
initiate new inquiries or demand more information from their own
managers? What questions must directors ask of their managers involved in
monitoring and to what extent must they raise questions about the answers
they receive?l82
The existence of paths to recovery is not meant to suggest that
pursuing a Caremark approach will be easy. Most corporations are likely to
have some kind of system in place to monitor violations of FOA and other
labor code provisions. While there may be isolated instances of deliberate
indifference to the overall monitoring structure or to information produced
thereunder, it seems safe to assume that corporate directors generally do not
adopt a "conscious disregard" posture.
There is also the issue of determining how shareholders have been
injured by a failure to monitor that is unattached to violations of law. The
Delaware Chancery Court has declared more than once that "[o]versight
duties under Delaware law are not designed to subject directors, even expert
directors, to personal liability for failure to predict the future and to
properly evaluate business risk."' 83 Where an auditing committee is
operative, efforts to plead a Caremark violation with the requisite
particularity based only on business performance will likely face judicial
skepticism.
182. See Sale, supra note 177, at 733-35.
183. In re Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., Civ. Action No. 5215-VCG at *64 (Del. Ch. Court, Oct. 12,
2011) (quoting Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 131) (emphasis in original).
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At the same time, the Delaware courts continue to preserve the
possibility that investors can meet their burden.184 With respect to injury,
perhaps lack of oversight on labor standards compliance has resulted in
serious adverse publicity that tangibly affects corporate goodwill with one
or more key audiences. Negative media coverage also may contribute to a
decision by large institutional investors that they will no longer hold shares.
Moreover, even if damage may be difficult to quantify, shareholders
presumably can still seek injunctive relief. Such injunctive relief, including
decrees that directors must monitor more vigorously to assure verifiable
labor standards compliance, might be better achieved through the proxy
rules approach discussed in the next section. In the end, though, the
Caremark approach offers some prospects for success, especially along the
"red flags" path.
4. Proxy Proposals Under SEC Rule 14a-8
Under SEC Rule 14a-8,' shareholders with minimum levels of
stock' may require a publicly traded corporation to include certain kinds
of proposals in the company's own proxy statements. If the company
wishes to exclude a particular shareholder proposal, it has the burden of
proving that exclusion is warranted under one of thirteen grounds set forth
in the rule.' 87 The SEC reviews requests for exclusion on a case by case
basis, issuing short "no-action" letters that declare the contested proposal
excludable or nonexcludable given the asserted regulatory grounds.'88
Proxy proposals under Rule 14a-8 provide an opportunity for socially
conscious investors to compel voting on resolutions designed to ensure
meaningful compliance with FOA and other code labor standards.
Proposals intended to encourage or require effective monitoring of
code implementation can be cast either as corporate governance initiatives
or as resolutions addressing corporate social responsibility.189 In general,
proposals involving corporate governance-typically framed as bylaw
amendments - have become more common and often garner significant
184. See Goldman Sachs, Civ. Action No. 5215-VCG at * 60-*61; In re Citigroup Inc. S'holder
Deriv. Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 126 (Del Ch. 2009).
185. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2012) [hereinafter Rule 14a-8].
186. See § 14a-8 (b)(1) (requiring that shareholder has continuously held at least $2,000 in market
value or 1% of corporation's voting securities for a minimum of one year).
187. See § 14a-8 (i) (listing thirteen grounds, several of which are discussed in text).
188. See generally Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, 63 Fed. Reg. 29106 (May 28,
1998).
189. See WILLIAM T. ALLEN, REINIER KRAAKMAN & GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN, COMMENTARIES AND
CASES ON THE LAW OF BusINEss ORGANIZATION 213 (3d ed. 2009) (reporting that most § 14a-8
shareholder proposals fall into one of these categories).
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shareholder votes.190 When challenged, they will likely be reviewed based
on 14a-8's exclusion of proposals "improper under state law."' 9 ' As
explained recently by the Delaware Supreme Court,
"a proper function of bylaws is ... to define the process and procedures by
which [substantive business] decisions are made"; the court added that
"[s]uch purely procedural bylaws do not improperly encroach upon the
board's managerial authority under [state law]." 92
Assuming investors' proposed bylaw would require that the board of
directors adopt some form of more rigorous monitoring and compliance
system than what currently exists, a key question is whether the proposal "is
one that establishes or regulates a process for substantive director decision
making, or one that mandates the decision itself."l 93 The answer may hinge
on how the proposed bylaw is phrased, but also on an analysis of its intent
and likely effect given the surrounding circumstances. 194 Shareholder
proposals worded as recommendations rather than unqualified mandates are
likely to pass muster. In addition, while the board retains the exclusive
authority to manage the corporation's business and affairs,195 a bylaw that
effectively requires expenditure of corporate funds to enhance the current
monitoring system does not thereby lose its process-related classification. 9 6
Over the past several years, the SEC has declined to exclude bylaws
that require the corporation to establish a human rights committee. 197
Proposals deemed nonexcludable expressly reserve the board's power to
manage the business and affairs of the company. In this regard, the SEC
evidently distinguishes between permissible human rights monitoring
proposals and impermissible monitoring of financial or reputational risks
that may be associated with human rights violations. 98 Thus, a bylaw or
resolution containing detailed instructions about steps the board should take
to monitor risks of code noncompliance may run afoul of Rule 14a-8's
exclusion of proposals "relating to the company's ordinary business
operations."' 99 The SEC recently authorized exclusion of a proposal
190. See id. at 213-14; Randall S. Thomas & James F. Cotter, Shareholder Proposals in the New
Millennium: Shareholder Support, Board Response, and Market Reaction, and Market Reaction, 13 J.
CORP. FINANCE 368 Table 2 (2007).
191. Section 14a-8 (i)(1). Bylaw amendments also may be challenged under the Rule's exclusion
for proposals already substantially implemented by the company. See § 14a-8 (i)(10). These grounds
for exclusion more often arise when the proposal involves amending a company's existing human rights
policies or code. See infra note 215 (discussing Kroger and Abercrombie & Fitch cases).
192. CA Inc., v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A. 2d 227, 234-35 (Del. 2008).
193. Id. at 235.
194. See id. at 235-36.
195. See, e.g., DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 141 (a).
196. See AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d at 236.
197. See, e.g., Chevron Corp., 2011 WL 291318 at *3-*4 (S.E.C. No-Action Letter, Mar. 28,
2011); Bank of Am., 2008 WL 591024 (S.E.C. No-Action Letter, Feb. 29, 2008).
198. See Bank ofAm., 2008 WL 591024, at *13 (Proponent Shareholders' Response).
199. Section 14a-8(i)(7).
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requesting the board to establish a risk committee that "should periodically
report to shareholders" and recommending that "the reports describe how an
identified risk category . .. is being addressed."2 00 Still, as long as the
bylaw proposes a commitment to monitor human rights issues themselves,
not the possibly consequential economic or legal risks, it stands a good
chance of being part of the company's proxy.
The alternative 14a-8 approach is to frame a labor standards proposal
as a matter of major social concern. In the 1998 amendments to its rules on
shareholder proposals, the SEC stated that even if proposals relate to
ordinary business operations, they will not be excludable if they "focus[] on
sufficiently significant social policy issues (e.g. significant discrimination
matters) ... because [such] proposals would transcend the day-to-day
business matters and raise policy issues so significant that [they] would be
appropriate for a shareholder vote." 201 The SEC further observed, however,
that a proposal on a significant social policy issue could still be excluded
depending on "the degree to which [it] seeks to 'micro-manage' the
company." 202 To illustrate, the agency added that a proposal would be
excludable if it "involves intricate detail, or seeks to impose specific time-
frames or methods for implementing complex policies." 203
The SEC's "micro-managing" factor provides more leeway for a
shareholder proposal to include particular instructions than is allowed under
the "relating to ordinary business operation" grounds for exclusion. In
practice the precise extent of additional leeway remains uncertain. A recent
district court decision sustaining excludability held that the challenged
proposal, encompassing certain principles for implementing new sexual
orientation and gender policies, sought "to micromanage the company to
an unacceptable degree." 204 The court noted that had the proposal "simply
request[ed] that [the company] add sexual orientation to its existing anti-
discrimination policy" the court "would be inclined to agree with the
[shareholders].205
The SEC has issued hundreds of no-action letters addressed to
corporate social responsibility proposals since the 1998 amendments
clarifying its excludability approach on the subject.206 Although these
200. See W. Union Co., 2011 WL 916163, at *1 (S.E.C. No-Action Letter, Mar. 14, 2011). Even
though its language was precatory, the proposal was excludable because it "requests a report that
describes how [the company] monitors and controls particular risks." Id. at * I (emphasis added).
201. Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, 63 Fed. Reg. 29106, 29108 (May 28, 1998).
202. Id.
203. Id
204. Apache Corp. v. N.Y.C. Emps. Ret. Sys., 621 F. Supp. 2d 444, 452 (S.D. Tex. 2008).
205. Id. at 451 n.7.
206. See 2011 U.S. Season Review: E&S Proposals, ISS: AN MSCI BRAND,
http://www.issgovemance.com/docs/ESProposals (last visited June 6, 2012) (reporting that investor
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letters have no binding effect as precedent or even on the parties, 2 07 they
offer useful guidance as to what level of prescriptive detail is acceptable to
the agency.
In a 2006 letter involving Wal-Mart, the SEC concluded that the
company could exclude a proposal requesting "that the board amend the
company's Equality of Opportunity policy to bar intimidation of company
employees exercising their right to freedom of association, develop
systems to prevent future violations of labor law, and publish periodic
reports to shareholders on its progress." 208  While the agency evidently
determined that this was unacceptable micro-managing, the Wal-Mart letter
appears to be an exception. The SEC has declined to exclude most human
rights-related proposals it has considered in recent years, including many
proposals specifying in detail the importance of ILO Conventions.
In a 2008 letter involving Chevron, the agency declared that the
company could not exclude a proposal requesting "that the board review
and develop guidelines.. .on investing in or withdrawing from countries
[and report these guidelines to shareholders] where:
* The government has engaged in ongoing and systematic
violation of human rights;
* The government is illegitimate;
* There is a call for economic sanctions by human rights and
democracy advocates and/or legitimate leaders of that country;
and
* Chevron's presence exposes the company to the risk of
government sanctions, negative brand publicity and consumer
boycotts ... .209
In a 2009 letter involving Halliburton, the SEC determined that the
company could not exclude a proposal "request[ing] management to review
its policies related to human rights to assess areas where the company needs
to adopt and implement additional policies" and report its findings within
fourteen months.210  The proposal further "recommend[ed]" that the
company "base its human rights policies" on The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights [and] the International Labor Organization's Core Labor
newsletter tracked 346 environmental and social proposals through summer 2011 and 384 proposals in
2010).
207. See, e.g., Apache Corp. v. Chevedden, 696 F. Supp. 2d 723, 737 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (reporting
that S.E.C. makes no attempt to reconcile its letters with prior determinations and the letters "rarely cite
precedent"); Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. S.E.C., 15 F.3d 254, 257 (2d Cir.
1994) (reporting agency's position that no-action letters "have no binding effect on the parties addressed
in the letters").
208. Wal-Mart Stores Workers, Inc., 2006 WL 695801, at *1 (S.E.C. No-Action Letter, Mar. 16,
2006).
209. Chevron Corp., 2008 WL809036, at *1-*2 (S.E.C. No-Action Letter, Mar. 21, 2008).
210. Halliburton Co., 2009 WL 800005, at *11 (S.E.C. No-Action Letter, Mar. 9, 2009).
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Standards" "and that it "report on the current system in place to ensure that
the company's contractors and suppliers are implementing human rights
policies in their operations, including monitoring, training [and] addressing
issues of non-compliance. . . ."211
In a 2011 letter involving Kroger, the agency declined to exclude a
proposal that "urge[d] the Board of Directors to adopt, implement, and
enforce a revised company-wide Code of Conduct, inclusive of suppliers
and sub-contractors, based on" enumerated ILO declarations and
conventions including "All workers have the right to form and join trade
unions and to bargain collectively" citing conventions 87 and 98.212 The
Kroger proposal also called for the board to "prepare a report at reasonable
cost to shareholders and the public concerning the implementation and
enforcement of" the revised ILO-centered code. 213
The Kroger and Halliburton proposals reflect a recent trend in which
shareholders have asked companies to revise and strengthen their existing
codes and to adopt tougher monitoring and reporting approaches. 214  In
declining to exclude these proposals, the SEC has rejected board
contentions that a company's current code or human rights policies already
addressed what the shareholders sought to accomplish.215 Additionally,
while shareholders regularly acknowledge that their proposals should not
survive if they are too specific, the SEC has declined to exclude proposals
urging companies to take on substantial and far-reaching human rights
commitments. These specified responsibilities include establishing
independent and rigorous monitoring processes and then publishing annual
reports based on the new processes that assess compliance with ILO-based
standards, 216 and even prohibiting the sale of products or the provision of
technical assistance to "repressive countries [when such support] could
contribute to human rights abuses."217
As these many examples make clear, a considerable amount of
specificity about labor standards compliance and monitoring will be
acceptable to the SEC, provided the shareholders' underlying verbal
instructions are precatory and not mandatory. The proviso in turn suggests
211. Id at *11-*12.
212. Kroger Co., 2011 WL 1337348, at *12 (S.E.C. No-Action Letter, Apr. 6, 2011).
213. Id.
214. See also Boeing Co., 2011 WL 5317484, at *6-*7 (S.E.C. No-Action Letter, Feb. 17, 2011);
Abercrombie & Fitch, 2010 WL 620060, at *22-*23 (S.E.C. No-Action Letter, Apr. 12, 2010).
215. A proposal is excludable if the company has already substantially implemented its contents.
See § 14a-8 (i)(10). The S.E.C. in Kroger and Abercrombie & Fitch rejected company arguments based
on the "substantially implemented" provision. See also Wal-Mart, 2011 WL 304198, at *1 (S.E.C. No-
Action Letter, Mar. 29, 2011).
216. See Wal-Mart, 2011 WL 304198, at *3-4; Halliburton Co., 2009 WL 800005, at *11 (S.E.C.
No-Action Letter, Mar. 9, 2009).
217. Yahoo! Inc., 2011 WL 494129, at 6* (S.E.C. No-Action Letter, Apr. 5, 2011).
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two caveats about 14a-8 proposals in general. First, a proposal that makes
it into the company's proxy statement may not be approved by a vote of all
shareholders, especially if opposed vigorously by senior management.
Although a high volume of corporate social responsibility resolutions are
proposed each year, and average annual voter support has more than
doubled between 2001 and 2011, relatively few proposals come close to
receiving a shareholder majority.218 Second, assuming the proposal is
approved, it may fail to bind the board precisely because it is framed in
precatory language. Accordingly, if the board is determined to ignore such
majority shareholder preferences, the success of labor standards compliance
proposals like those in Kroger, Chevron, and Halliburton may hinge on
shareholders' willingness to vote out one or more defiant board members.
Nothwithstanding these caveats, 14a-8 proxy proposals offer genuine
promise. The "soft enforcement" of shareholder votes rather than court
proceedings may well exert pressure on a board of directors to become
more aggressive on FOA monitoring and compliance. Refusal to do so in
the face of a majority or substantial minority vote may not lead to ouster of
board members, but it carries significant collateral risks. Additional media
coverage of the board's refusal may give rise to extended negative publicity
that adversely affects the company's business reputation and market
standing. Such a refusal may also be invoked by shareholders as evidence
of ignoring a red flag in the context of Caremark litigation. Faced with
such risks, boards may at times decide to yield to a majority shareholder
vote or even a substantial minority preference expressed with sufficient
intensity. Moreover, as it has become clear that a range of detailed human
rights proposals are not excludable, boards often opt to negotiate with
shareholders rather than seeking to exclude or oppose their labor standards
efforts.219
218. See ALLEN, KRAAKMAN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 189, at 213 (reporting that majority of
proposals do not exceed 10%); 2011 U.S. Season Review, supra note 206 (reporting 20.5 average
support level for first five months of2011, compared with 8.7% a decade earlier). Further, the increased
use of proxy proposals has drawn fire from some corporate observers concerned about the harassment of
management. See, e.g., James R. Copland, Proxy Monitor 2011: A Report on Corporate Governance
and Shareholder Activism, Sept. 2011, at 3, 19 (criticizing this form of shareholder activism as "more a
vehicle for interest-group capture of corporations rather than for mitigating agency costs and improving
shareholder returns").
219. See, e.g., 2011 U.S. Season Review, supra note 206 (referencing high number of proposals
withdrawn and solutions negotiated on sexual orientation nondiscrimination). See also Adam M.
Kanzer, Putting Human Risk on the Agenda: The Use of Shareholder Proposals to Address Corporate
Human Rights Performance, FINANCE FOR A BETTER WORLD, 2009, at 9-10 (on file with author)
(describing numerous instances of shareholder-MNC dialogue encouraging companies to modify their
codes so as to incorporate core ILO conventions and develop credible systems of implementation).
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V. CONCLUSION
This article has considered a range of private enforcement options that
might be pursued to enforce FOA provisions in corporate codes. There are
obstacles confronting each option, and many if not most face substantial
headwinds. Still, certain claims appear to hold promise and to warrant
further research and thought beyond what has been presented in overview
form. Moreover, the options identified here are not meant to be exhaustive;
there is ample room for other scholars as well as practitioners and NGOs to
push the envelope.
The article also has attempted to answer the underlying "why"
question. Why bother to envision private enforcement strategies when the
status quo is corporate codes consciously framed in terms that are meant to
be unenforceable? A partial response involves the purpose of codes. By
promoting their commitment to FOA and other labor standards,
corporations expect to foster goodwill and its attendant economic benefits
in a rational market, and also to achieve a measure of regulatory
forbearance. Insofar as corporate codes are intended to produce such rule-
of-law type advantages, there is reason to encourage greater rule-of-law
focus on their implementation.
An additional response involves the creative dynamic of the law
regulating labor markets. Historically, workplace law has been essentially
unidirectional: legislatures, agencies, and courts have acted to redress the
perceived oppressions of employers' economic power by encouraging or
requiring basic, socially acceptable terms of employment.220 As the domain
of collective bargaining has receded, and global and domestic labor markets
have trended toward low-wage work, acutely unequal bargaining status has
become the norm for tens of millions of individual workers. The law's
response has included new legislative directions22 1 but also judicially
inspired innovations such as contract and tort-based exceptions to
employment at will.
Prior to 1980, state courts uniformly rejected the argument that
employee handbooks could serve as the basis for an implied employment
contract.222 Judges and commentators invoked traditional doctrinal concepts
such as lack of independent consideration, no meeting of the minds, and the
220. See generally Clyde W. Summers, Labor Law As the Century Turns: A Changing of the
Guard, 67 NEB. L. REv. 7 (1988). Other areas of law, such as the tax code and the regulation of
securities, are less unidirectional and perhaps more cyclical when compared with workplace law.
221. See, e.g., Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, Pub. L. No. 100-379, 102 Stat.
890 (1988); Employee Polygraph Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 100-347, 102 Stat. 647 (1988): Family
and Medical Leave Act, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (1993).
222. See, e.g., Johnson v. Nat'l Beef Packing Co., 551 P.2d 779, 782 (Kan. 1976); Sargent v. Ill.
Inst. of Techn., 397 N.E. 2d 443, 446 (111. App. 1979); Shaw v. S.S. Kresge Co., 328 N.E.2d 775, 778-
79 (Ind. App. 1975); Edwards v. Citibank N.A., 418 N.Y.S.2d 269, 270 (App. Div. 1979).
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absence of a fixed term.223  Today, courts in 41 states have held that
handbooks or personnel manuals may give rise to contractual
entitlements. 224 Even more states have adopted the public policy exception
to employment at will. 225  It is at least plausible to maintain that by
generating and intensifying discussion about doctrinal innovations for
enforcing corporate codes, we may encourage attorneys, judges, and
legislatures to take more seriously the options for complementary or
interstitial private enforcement.
Finally, FOA is a special candidate for increased attention because of
its potential to enhance internal monitoring and effective code compliance.
While labor standards codes are generally treated as soft and unenforceable,
FOA provisions have occupied a subtly disfavored status despite its
position as a core ILO convention. Envisioning new pathways to
enforcement will shine additional light on the framing and phrasing of FOA
provisions. In that regard, a more precise and accountable code
commitment to FOA should lead to more meaningful worker participation
in the monitoring of labor standards. Fittingly if ironically, such a result
could help to reduce the need for complementary private enforcement
actions.
223. See generally Richard Harrison Winters, Note, Employee Handbooks and Employment-At-Will
Contracts, 1985 DUKE L.J. 196, 204 (1985).
224. See SUMMERS ET AL., supra note 95, at 193-200.
225. See id. at 179-92 (reporting all fifty states have adopted some form of the public policy
exception).
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